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Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan
Divide over Alien Tort Statute
Litigation
By Jide Nzelibe*
Abstract: Ever since the modern revival of Alien Tort Statue (ATS) litigation in
1980, Democratic administrations have favored adjudication under the statute
while Republican administrations have been against it. But why would this be
the case? After all, the received wisdom assumes that presidents (from either
party) are empire builders who prefer to shape international law and foreign
policy without any meddling from the courts. This Essay advances a partisan
entrenchment logic to explain the variance in support of ATS adjudication
across different administrations. Under this logic, presidents and judges are
political actors whose partisan preferences regarding substantive international
law will sometimes trump their institutional or interpretive empire-building
objectives. Thus, presidents who are sympathetic to the ideological goals of a
specific international law norm may be willing to relinquish interpretive
authority to courts in order to entrench the norm in a way that binds their
successors and other domestic political actors. Conversely, judges who are
unsympathetic to the policy goals of an international law norm may be willing to
relinquish interpretive authority to the President (or the political branches) in
order to prevent legal entrenchment. These divergent approaches toward ATS
adjudication have been shaped by the preferences of interest groups aligned
with the Republican and Democratic parties. The Article concludes by
examining the conflicting litigation positions of lawyers from the Obama and
Bush Administrations over the scope of the ATS in the Supreme Court’s recent
decision of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In perusing U.S. presidential submissions to federal courts in certain
foreign affairs controversies, one may be forgiven for thinking that the
government’s litigation positions are hardwired to be predictably
inconsistent. Take, for instance, disputes under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), a long dormant, founding-era statute that was judicially revived in
the late 1970s to permit foreign plaintiffs to bring claims for egregious
human rights abuses committed by foreign governments. In the initial case
of Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,1 the Carter Administration submitted an amicus
brief to the Second Circuit cautioning that judicial refusal to recognize a
private cause of action under the ATS “might seriously damage the
credibility of our nation’s commitment to the protection of human rights.”2
Since then every Democratic administration has echoed the view that
judicial enforcement of ATS claims is broadly consistent with American
foreign policy objectives.3

1

630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22–23, Filártiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79–6090).
3
See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
2
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By contrast, Republican administrations from that of Reagan to that of
George W. Bush have been consistently skeptical of the adjudication of
ATS controversies.4 Take, for instance, the Bush Administration’s
submission before the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain.5 First, it
argued that the history and context of the ATS cautioned against
extraterritorial application.6 Second, it insisted that allowing litigation to
proceed under the statute would imperil American foreign policy.7 Finally,
the Administration warned the Court that adjudication under the ATS
would be in fundamental tension with the constitutional separation of
powers: “making any violation of customary international law actionable is
profoundly flawed and would routinely generate the potential for judicial
pronouncements at odds with the policies of the political branches on
matters of foreign policy, which courts seek to avoid.”8
Most recently, during arguments before the Supreme Court in Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,9 the Office of the Solicitor General under
the Obama Administration took the unusual step of backing away from a
litigation position it adopted eight years earlier during the Bush
Administration as to whether the ATS could apply extraterritorially and
whether litigation under the statute threatened executive branch flexibility

Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94–9035, 94–9069) (observing that prosecution under the ATS of Radovan
Karadzic does not raise a political question); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 15–21, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10–1491 (U.S. Dec.
21. 2011) (observing that domestic law regarding corporate liability should apply in ATS
cases).
4
See, e.g., Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 3, Trajano v.
Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 86–2448, 86–15039) (arguing that the ATS
“does not give the district courts subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by a foreign national
plaintiff against a foreign government official based on acts occurring in a foreign country”);
Reply Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03–339) (contending that the ATS is merely a
jurisdictional grant and that it does not apply extraterritorially).
5
See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46–50, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03–339), 2004 WL 182581 [hereinafter Sosa
Brief for the United States] (opposing extraterritorial application of the ATS regardless of
defendant’s status).
6
See id. at 47–49.
7
See id. at 42–46, 48–49 (arguing that the ATS was designed “to open federal courts to
aliens for the purpose of avoiding, not provoking, conflicts with other nations”).
8
Id. at 35; see also Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae at 4, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00–56603, 00–56628)
(“It would be extraordinary to give U.S. law an extraterritorial effect to regulate conduct by a
foreign country vis-a-vis [sic] its own citizens in its own territory, and all the more so for a
federal court to do so as a matter of common law-making power.”).
9
Order granting writ of certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472
(Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10–1491).
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in foreign affairs.10 As various commentators have observed, it is rare for
the Solicitor General to change litigation positions before the Court from
one administration to another, especially on issues that implicate the
institutional interests of the executive branch.11 In this case, however, the
Obama Administration not only appeared to embrace a position regarding
ATS adjudication that was more in line with prior Democratic
administrations, but also seemed to implicitly reject that of its immediate
predecessor. When the Kiobel Court eventually handed down its decision
rejecting the plaintiffs’ ATS claims,12 it embraced a presumption against
extraterritoriality that was more in line with the interpretation endorsed by
the Bush Administration.13 While the Court was divided five to four over
how close a territorial link would be required, the Justices all agreed that
ATS claims without a substantial link to the United States would no longer
be actionable under the statute.14
Similar peculiarities abound in judicial efforts to enforce ATS claims.
Some federal judges have declined to adjudicate ATS claims on the merits
even when the executive branch encouraged them to do so. Moreover,
breaking with a long tradition of judicial deference to the President on
foreign affairs, certain federal judges have routinely declined presidential
requests to abstain from adjudicating ATS claims. If there is a coherent
logic to these varied judicial approaches in ATS claims, it has long
confounded courts and academic commentators.15 Indeed, for the most part,
the commentary on ATS adjudication has been largely normative with
10
See Sosa Brief for the United States, supra note 10; but see Supplemental Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance at 3–5, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, No. 10–1491 (U.S. June 11, 2012), 2012 WL 2161290 (arguing that
extraterritorial application of the ATS against domestic corporations could be allowed but
not against foreign corporations in the circumstances presented).
11
See infra text accompanying note 176.
12
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
13
As John Bellinger observes in a blog posting, the extraterritoriality issue was raised
not only in amicus briefs he filed in Kiobel, but also in government briefs he helped file
during the Bush Administration when he was the State Department Legal Adviser. See John
Bellinger, Reflections on Kiobel, LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 22, 2013, 8:52 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/04/reflections-on-kiobel/.
14
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669–71.
15
Courts sometimes suggest that some deference should be accorded the executive
branch’s foreign policy judgments in ATS cases, but what the scope of this deference means
as a practical matter is somewhat unclear. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and
Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 680 (2000) (“The executive branch, however, is not
charged with administering the ATS. Rather, the statute is a direct congressional regulation
of federal court jurisdiction. As a result, there is no basis in the statute for presuming a
delegation of lawmaking power to the executive branch.”); but see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733
n.21 (observing that where the U.S. State Department has weighed in, “there is a strong
argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of
the case’s impact on foreign policy”).
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various camps staking out their positions as to whether or not expansive
judicial enforcement is desirable.16
This Article sidesteps the normative debates regarding ATS litigation
and focuses on the following questions: Why would Democratic
administrations from Carter through Obama be willing to encourage federal
courts to resolve disputes that would likely constrain the President’s
flexibility to deploy the full range of foreign policy tools in bargaining with
other states? And why have Republican administrations tended to stake out
a much more skeptical position on the merits of judicially sanctioned
litigation under the ATS? Moreover, why, despite invitations by certain
presidential administrations, are some federal judges reluctant to adjudicate
ATS claims on the merits? Finally, why are certain federal judges willing
to expand the scope of ATS claims even when the executive branch
discourages judicial involvement?
Unlike more conventional accounts, this Article attempts to explore
the logic of ATS human rights litigation through the lens of partisan
politics. Simply put, to understand both variations in presidential and
judicial practices on ATS claims, one needs to focus on the underlying
incentives faced by different regimes and the institutional actors within
16

See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 353 (2011)
(arguing that the premise of corporate liability under the ATS has “shaky, indeed illusory,
analytical and jurisprudential foundations”); Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits
on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 271 (2009) (arguing
that corporate liability under the ATS may conflict with international law principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 587, 591 (2002) (asserting that “the First Congress implicitly intended to limit the
[ATS] to suits involving at least one U.S. citizen defendant”); but cf. Robert Knowles, A
Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1149 (2011) (arguing
that ATS litigation may actually promote the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States); Anthony D’Amato, Editorial Comment, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 65 (1988) (observing that the ATS’s
history indicates that it was enacted to be “an important part of a national security interest”
and that it applies to cases involving both alien plaintiffs and alien defendants); William S.
Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and
Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 689 (2002) (“The argument that Congress meant to limit
jurisdiction to suits against U.S. citizens, however, is contrary to the plain language of the
Statute as well as the history leading to its adoption. . . . [T]he law of nations is part of the
‘Laws of the United States’ . . . .”); Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society,
and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 971 (2004) (arguing that ATS
litigation does not harm U.S. foreign relations, nor America’s “standing as an international
leader in the promotion and protection of human rights”); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 489–
93 (1989) (defending the use of Alien Tort litigation to vindicate broader abstract norms);
Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2640 n.209 (1997) (observing the failure of some international law theorists to
appreciate the ability of ATS litigation to internalize international legal norms).
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such regimes. The central claim is that both political and judicial actors
may be willing to sacrifice their institutional prerogatives to interpret
international law and shape foreign policy if they believe that doing so will
advance their political or ideological goals.
In this picture, a Democratic administration may be more willing to
encourage expansive judicial interpretation of human rights controversies
because doing so will allow it to shore up support among its left-leaning
constituencies and help it distinguish its human rights credentials from the
Republican opposition. More specifically, such a strategy may help leftleaning administrations entrench ideological objectives on issues in which
they are perceived to have an electoral advantage over conservatives. By
contrast, Republican administrations have a stronger incentive to play up
their perceived strengths in promoting national security and business
interests. They are therefore likely to consider an increased judicial role in
human rights litigation as an obstacle to advancing those issues in which
they tend to have an electoral advantage over Democrats. Furthermore,
right-leaning judges may be more willing to defer to presidential exclusivity
in international human rights policy, especially when they suspect that their
fellow judges are more likely to be influenced by progressive international
law norm entrepreneurs than the political branches.
Put differently, in the strategic environment depicted above, elected
officials and judges have an incentive to provide mutual political capital for
each other with regard to polarizing domestic disputes over international
human rights enforcement. Left-leaning elected officials may rely on court
decisions by sympathetic judges to shore up political support within their
coalitions and attempt to depict conservative groups opposed to a
progressive vision of human rights as outliers or extremists. Conservative
elected officials may also seek to exploit deep-seated divisions within the
judiciary over the merits of enforcing human rights to question the
democratic pedigree of using courts to enforce contested norms of
customary international law. Finally, right-leaning judges may also
anticipate that they will receive political cover from sympathetic interest
groups and members of Congress if they resist invitations of a Democratic
administration to engage in a more expansive interpretation of ATS claims.
This Article first critically analyzes the extant literature on judicial
involvement in foreign affairs controversies. It then outlines a simple
partisan electoral competition explanation to account for the variation in
both the judicial and presidential approaches to foreign relations
controversies in the United States. Finally, it illustrates this dynamic by
reference to civil disputes under the ATS.
The basic argument is that Democratic and Republican administrations
are responsive to distinct constituencies who are likely to have conflicting
preferences over the wisdom of ATS adjudication. Democrats have
stronger ties to organized trade unions, transnational norm activists, and
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minority groups who are likely to have complementary goals in pushing
more aggressively for the domestic enforcement of international human
rights norms. On the other hand, the constituency of the Republican Party
includes internationally oriented business interests, as well as hawkish
groups who are likely to view ATS adjudication as an obstacle to their
policy objectives.
Yet, before the early 2000s, the distributional implications of ATS
adjudication were not necessarily as pronounced for conservative leaning
constituencies. Two developments changed this dynamic. The first was the
expansion of the target of ATS claims to corporate defendants, which
started in the late 1990s.17 The other was the onset of the Bush
Administration’s war against terrorism in 2001, which raised concerns
about the exposure of foreign military allies to tort claims in United States
courts. These developments helped mobilize conservative business and
hawkish constituencies who now view ATS adjudication not only as a
hindrance to foreign policy flexibility of the executive branch, but also as a
threat to their material and ideological interests.
This Article also explores the significance of the Court’s recent
decision in Kiobel and the conflicting positions staked out by lawyers from
the Bush and Obama Administrations on the question of the territorial reach
of the ATS. It concludes by exploring some implications for some of the
debates concerning optimal constitutional design in foreign relations.
II.

COURTS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS
Commentary on the willingness of courts to adjudicate more
aggressively on foreign relations controversies tends to rely on formalist or
functionalist explanations. Typically, formalists evaluate questions about
the reach of judicial authority by reference to the constitutional text or the
founders’ perceived allocation of interpretive authority.18
But the
Constitution’s text on foreign relations is sufficiently ambiguous that
traditional canons of interpretation are unlikely to resolve the most
contested questions about the role of either the courts or the political
branches in foreign affairs.19
Moreover, while resort to formal

17
See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of
the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
18
Cf. Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 154 (2004) (observing that the
debate about whether the ATS creates a cause of action has been “one of the sharpest and
most bitter” and that “neither side has convinced the other” using formalist and originalist
methods).
19
See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 94 (2009) (“The uniqueness of foreign affairs stems in part from a void in
the text that has long bedeviled constitutional analysis in this area. Article II of the
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constitutional rules regarding the separation of powers is undoubtedly
important, it does not explain why courts would ever change their
willingness to intervene in foreign relations controversies or why the
political branches would allow them. As a generation of social science
scholarship suggests, political actors have a wide range of tools to constrain
courts that act against their institutional interests regardless of what one
thinks the constitutional text says.20 And even when formal authority is
specifically allocated to a specific branch of government, it does not
necessarily mean that such authority will be politically sustainable over
time, especially when domestic institutional actors have conflicting
preferences.
Another class of explanations, which is more functionalist in nature,
emphasizes factors such as the superpower status of the United States, the
unique demands during the Cold War, and the competence of the political
branches to adequately represent American interests abroad.21 According to
one such view, as the political realism that characterized much of the Cold
War recedes, courts are emboldened to play a more significant role in
safeguarding individual liberties and basic rights from the actions of
autocratic governments.22 A related view focuses on constructivist
Constitution specifically allocates only a handful of foreign affairs powers to the President,
but Article I fails to provide Congress with all, or even most, of the remaining powers
necessary to conduct foreign policy.”); Jide Nzelibe, Our Partisan Affairs Constitution, 97
MINN. L. REV. 838, 841 (2013) (“[T]he established constitutional doctrine governing the
allocation of foreign affairs authority is sufficiently sparse and ambiguous that there is often
significant leeway for political actors to influence the contours of foreign affairs authority to
suit their political objectives.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive
Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 236–37 (2001) (“A common tenet of
scholars who agree on little else is that once one moves beyond the war and treaty-making
powers, the Constitution itself has little to say about the relative roles of the President and
Congress, but rather contains substantial gaps that compel resort to other considerations.”).
20
See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 585 (2001) (“[G]iven the institutional
constraints imposed on the [U.S. Supreme] Court, the Justices cannot effectuate their own
policy and institutional goals without taking account of the goals and likely actions of the
members of the other branches.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 382, 384 (1993) (arguing that the “constitutional structure suggests that
judicial review might be modeled as a positive political game”); Tonja Jacobi, The Impact of
Positive Political Theory on Old Questions of Constitutional Law and the Separation of
Powers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 159–62 (2006) (discussing the role of a strategic judiciary
in a separation of powers context).
21
See, e.g., Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal
Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007)
(using international relations realism to argue for greater judicial deference to executivebranch views in ATS cases); Knowles, supra note 19, at 95–102; Jide Nzelibe, The
Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 992–95 (2004).
22
See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (describing the worthwhile trend
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explanations that stress the trans-judicial diffusion of norms across national
borders.23 In its most common version, this framework assumes a form of
judicial cross-pollination, which results in a semi-convergence of beliefs by
judges across states regarding the wisdom of using courts to protect human
rights.24
While all these explanations help illuminate certain aspects of why
judges might be more willing to enforce human rights norms, they are
hardly sufficient. First, they do not account for the precise timing of when
judges might decide to be more aggressive in enforcing human rights
norms. Second, they hardly explain why there is significant variation in the
willingness of judges to enforce these norms within and across various
states. Third, like the formalist accounts, they do not explain why the
political branches would suddenly be willing to allow courts to intrude on
institutional terrain that has been traditionally occupied by other power
holders. Fourth, these theories presuppose that the judiciary is a collective
institution that has a coherent and well-defined set of institutional
preferences. As Adrian Vermeule has observed in another context, such a
notion suffers from the logical fallacy of division because the judiciary as
an institutional actor is a “‘they,’ and not an ‘it.’”25 Given the conflicting
toward judicial empowerment); see also JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY:
WHY THE WORLD SHOULD WELCOME AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004) (arguing for greater
national independence from world bodies and trends). Some commentators have also
pointed to the increasing role played by international courts in resolving human rights
disputes. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 709 (1999) (“When future
international scholars look back at international law and organizations at the end of the
twentieth century, they probably will refer to the enormous expansion and transformation of
the international judiciary as the single most important development of the post-Cold War
age.”).
23
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 639–46 (2004); Roger P. Alford, The
Nobel Effect: Nobel Peace Prize Laureates as International Norm Entrepreneurs, 49 VA. J.
INT’L L. 61 (2008) (exploring how Nobel Laureates have played an especially important role
as preference-creators in the development of international legal norms); Melissa A. Waters,
Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and
Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 506–29 (2005) (discussing norm export and
its role in the development of customary international law on the death penalty). For a good
discussion of norm diffusion in an international legal context, see Katerina Linos, How Can
International Organizations Shape National Welfare States?: Evidence from Compliance
with European Union Directives, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 547 (2007).
24
See Melissa Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretative
Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 628 (2007) (“By
developing a wide variety of so-called interpretive incorporation techniques, judges are
entrenching international treaty obligations into domestic law, thus becoming powerful
mediators between the domestic and international legal regimes.”).
25
See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the
Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 555–64 (2005) (observing that,
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policy and ideological preferences of judges across the United States
judiciary, it is a somewhat heroic assumption to think they will ever
converge upon any coherent set of preferences or beliefs about how, when,
and whether to enforce international law.
Finally, a realist approach to the expansion of judicial authority in
foreign affairs focuses on the self-interested incentives of judges. Eyal
Benvenisti and George Downs, for example, have emphasized institutional
self-preservation rationales, contending that domestic courts may resort to
greater judicial oversight of foreign affairs in order to resist globalization’s
threat to their national democratic processes.26 In this picture, rather than
being enamored by global justice and the prospect of spreading human
rights norms, courts strategically expand their dockets in order to reclaim
some of the policy space that has been delegated to international
institutions.
This Article builds on the work of Benvenisti, Downs, and others to
develop a more comprehensive realist framework for explaining both
judicial and presidential attitudes towards foreign affairs controversies in
the United States. Unlike Downs and Benvenisti, however, this framework
does not focus on institutional self-preservation or empire building
rationales. It instead stresses a partisan or an electoral logic to judicial
intervention in disputes implicating foreign affairs. By incorporating
partisan political competition, this approach better explains why we might
observe variation in the willingness of American judges to adjudicate on
disputes implicating certain foreign affairs, such as ATS disputes.
Moreover, it also explains why different presidential administrations might
exhibit divergent preferences for a more active role for courts in certain
foreign relations controversies. At bottom, this account is consistent with
the view that judges will not tend to go out on a lurch to grab power from
the political branches, but are more likely to take on those roles assigned to
them by other power holders for self-interested reasons.27 After outlining
the basic assumptions underlying the theory, this Article will then illustrate
the theoretical framework by reference to disputes under the ATS.

among other such factors, “[t]he collective character of the judiciary produces irreducible
disagreement about competing interpretive approaches” and that even where disagreement is
absent, “results [will] contradict widely agreed-upon interpretive rules, and thus count as
mistakes from any normative perspective”).
26
See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy,
and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 61 (2009); Eyal Benvenisti,
Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 244 (2008).
27
See Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583,
586 (2005).
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III. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This Part sketches out how partisan orientation influences both the
willingness of presidents to delegate interpretive authority over certain
foreign affairs controversies to judges and the willingness of judges to
accept that delegation. More specifically, it explores why different
administrations would have varying preferences towards empowering
courts to address international human rights controversies.
At bottom, this framework assumes that societal pressure alone from
human rights groups and their allies is not sufficient to account for why
elected officials might take up the banner of protecting human rights in
foreign countries. Simply put, elevating the legal protection of human
rights violations committed in foreign countries is often fraught with
significant political risks, and politicians are not likely to give up their
institutional prerogative in this policy area unless they foresee tangible
political benefits. But as suggested in more detail below, even when such
benefits exist, they are not likely to be symmetric across Republican and
Democratic administrations. On the contrary, the entrenchment of human
rights policies through judicial empowerment is more likely to favor the
ideological and electoral objectives of Democrats or left-leaning parties.
The theoretical framework advanced here envisions the partisan
dynamic as involving two separate inquiries. First, how does the partisan
orientation of an administration affect its choice of certain foreign policy
objectives? Second, how does judicial empowerment affect the ability of
elected officials to carry out and entrench their partisan foreign policy
objectives?
A. The Electoral Logic: Partisan Orientation and Foreign Policy
Political ideologies play a significant role in both structuring how
political parties are organized and how such parties solicit support from
those members of the domestic audience on whom they depend for electoral
support. In the United States, for instance, recent research suggests that
political parties exhibit distinct ideological preferences over foreign policy
objectives.28 The received wisdom is that Republicans (or right-leaning
parties) tend to emphasize free trade and a more hawkish national security
stance, while Democrats (or left-leaning parties) tend to prioritize
redistributive economic policies, human rights for oppressed and minority
groups, a greater role for multilateral institutions, and the resolution of
international conflict through peaceful mediation.29 Taking a glance at

28

See, e.g., Charles A. Kupchan & Peter L. Trubowitz, Dead Center: The Demise of
Liberal Internationalism in the United States, 32 INT’L SECURITY 7 (2007) (chronicling the
rise of partisan polarization in American foreign policy).
29
See generally Danny Hayes, Candidate Qualities through a Partisan Lens: A Theory
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post-World War II (WWII) platforms of the Republican and Democratic
parties appears to vindicate the received wisdom. For the most part,
Democratic Party platforms have tended to adopt a much more sanguine
view of multilateral institutions and international human rights norms than
their Republican counterparts.30 Republican Party platforms, on the other
hand, tend to stress issues like national security, free trade, and assistance
targeted to individuals subjected to mistreatment by communist regimes or
other foreign adversaries of the United States.31 Beyond the United States,
comparative politics scholars have pointed out that European conservative
parties are similarly more hawkish and less prone to egalitarian human
rights sentiments than European left-leaning parties.32
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that ideology alone is not
sufficient to guarantee that a political party will stake out a strong position
of Trait Ownership, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 908, 910 n.2 (2005) (reaffirming Petrocik’s data
from 1996 and observing that issue ownership between the parties has remained largely
unchanged over the years); John R. Petrocik, Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with
a 1980 Case Study, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825, 832 (1996) (showing the results of surveys,
which indicated generally favorable perceptions of Republicans in foreign policy, defense,
economic, and social issues, while Democrats had favorable perceptions in social welfare
issues); John R. Petrocik et al., Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952–2000,
118 POL. SCI. Q. 599, 599, 603 (2003) (“Democrats have an electoral advantage when
problems and issues associated with social welfare and intergroup relationships are
salient[,]” while “Republicans are viewed as likely to protect traditional American values,
keep taxes low, government small, and national security strong.”).
30
See Political Party Platforms: 2008 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283
(endorsing the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as well as the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities); Political Party Platforms: Democratic Party Platform of 1960,
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(July
11,
1960),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29602 (affirming American commitment
to the United Nations and the termination of all race discrimination); Political Party
Platforms: Democratic Party Platform of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 13, 1992),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29610 (emphasizing the importance of
multilateral trade agreements and advocating for an American plan to eliminate world
hunger).
31
For instance, both the 1980 and 1984 platforms accused the Democrats of not being
sufficiently solicitous of human rights of citizens in Soviet Bloc states. See Political Party
Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 15, 1980),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844; Political Party Platforms:
Republican Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845.
32
See Eric Belanger & Bonnie M. Meguid, Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and IssueBased Vote Choice, 27 ELECTORAL STUD. 477, 478 (2008) (analogizing the issue-ownership
reputations of the American Democrats and Republicans with those of the English Labour
Party and Conservative Party, respectively); Glenn Palmer et al., What’s Stopping You?: The
Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary
Democracies, 30 INT’L INTERACTIONS 1, 7–8 (2004).
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on certain foreign policy issues like human rights or national security.
After all, parties are not simply policy maximizers; they also care about
winning elections. There are, however, significant electoral benefits that
political parties stand to gain by distinguishing their foreign policy
positions.
First, while elected officials often seek a broad base of support for
their policies to get elected, it is the views of the elected official’s core
constituency that are often most crucial in how policies are ultimately
carried out. As Bueno De Mesquita and others have observed, politicians
have an incentive to focus their efforts on the subset of the electorate that
make up their winning coalition. In democracies that winning coalition is
not necessarily a majority of the voters, but rather, a subset that is
comprised of the politician’s core partisan supporters.33 Elected leaders
have an incentive to be mindful of the policy preferences of the narrow
coalitions that are largely responsible for keeping them in office. Thus,
these leaders are likely to take measures that minimize the risks that they
will erode their support among members of this coalition.34
All else equal, we should expect Democratic politicians, once they are
in office, to be more likely to favor a more progressive approach to human
rights policies than Republican politicians. Why would this be the case?
Simply put, Democrats are more likely to have their winning coalition
comprised of voters and interest groups who are sympathetic to promoting
social and economic rights across national boundaries.35 In other words,
since governments of the left draw their base of support from labor and
minority groups, such governments may be more open to pursuing an
aggressive human rights policy because doing so is more likely to reinforce
the power of their loyal constituencies. It might also weaken the power of
domestic forces opposed to progressive social and economic reform.
Moreover, the substantive nature of the rights protected under U.N. Human
Rights Conventions and norms of customary international law are more
likely to favor the substantive political goals of left-leaning parties. For
instance, the various U.N. Human Rights Conventions typically touch on
the scope of many substantive rights that are still the source of significant
33

See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL (2003);
Edward L. Glaeser et al., Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on
Religious Values, 120 Q. J. ECON. 1283 (2005); Gábor Virág, Playing for your Own
Audience: Extremism in Two-Party Elections, 10 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 891 (2008).
34
See, e.g., T. Clifton Morgan & Kenneth N. Bickers, Domestic Discontent and the
External Use of Force, 36 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 25 (1992).
35
As Bueno de Mesquita and others have observed, politicians have an incentive to
focus their efforts on the subset of the electorate that makes up their winning coalition, and
in democracies, that winning coalition is not necessarily a majority of the voters but rather a
subset that is comprised of the politician’s core partisan supporters. See MESQUITA ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 27787.
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contention in advanced democracies, such as capital punishment, abortion,
discrimination towards women and minority groups, rights of immigrants
and refugees, coercive interrogation, and rights of criminal suspects.36
Moreover, many of the U.N. Human Rights Conventions espouse a vision
of positive economic and social rights, such as access to decent living
conditions, affordable housing, education, income, and employment37—
objectives that although favored by many groups on the left, are largely
anathema to core right-leaning constituencies.
On the other hand, both U.N. and Regional Human Rights
Conventions do very little to protect the rights that right-leaning parties and
constituencies care most about, such as the right to private property, school
choice, or—more uniquely in the American context—the right to bear
arms.38 To be sure, these U.N. Conventions also tend to protect rights to
worship and religious practice, which are of importance to certain rightleaning constituencies, but such rights are hardly under threat in modern
democracies. Thus, to the extent that promoting a progressive global vision
of human rights diverts resources and attention from those foreign policy
issues Republican constituents care most about, we should anticipate
Republican administrations being more sensitive to the political costs of
prioritizing human rights policies in their interaction with foreign states.
More importantly, however, many of the U.N. Human Rights Conventions
and customary human rights norms may often pose an obstacle to achieving
policy goals favored by right-leaning constituencies. For instance, the
Religious Right in the United States, which has been a significantly
influential advocacy coalition within the Republican Party, has been
generally supportive of capital punishment and morality legislation and has
been skeptical of government intrusion into the family sphere.39 These
36
See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1981); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
37
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (recognizing
rights to health care, education, and a living wage); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring the right to a
sufficient standard of living, including the right to health care).
38
See Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 150 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (describing
conservative opposition to human rights treaties in the United States).
39
See, e.g., U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC
LIFE (2008) (showing results of surveys, which express disapproval of issues such as
evolution, homosexuality, abortion and large government from Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Mormons, and evangelical Christians.); Our Agenda, CHRISTIAN COAL. OF AM.,
http://www.cc.org/our_agenda (last visited June 19, 2012) (announcing its adherence to
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positions conflict with both the spirit and the provisions of the various U.N.
Human Rights Conventions. Indeed, such deep-seated partisan divisions
over U.N. Human Rights Conventions continue to permeate the current
political landscape. For instance, the 2008 Democratic platform endorsed
the ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD), and the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).40 By contrast, the
2008 Republican platform vowed to reject the CEDAW and the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC):
Because the U.N. has no mandate to promote radical social
engineering, any effort to address global social problems must
respect the fundamental institutions of marriage and family . . . . We
reject any treaty or agreement that would violate those values. That
includes the U.N. convention on women’s rights . . . and the U.N.
convention on the rights of the child.41

Second, there is yet another, more important reason to think that the
electoral benefits (and costs) associated with pursuing an aggressive
international human rights policy are not going to be symmetric across
Republican and Democratic administrations. As some commentators have
observed, parties generally develop reputations for addressing certain issues
better than others and have an incentive to emphasize those issues on which
they have an electoral advantage. Thus, rather than seek votes according to
a spatial model of electoral competition, where each party stakes out
different positions on the same issue, parties tend to own issues and then try
to compete by convincing voters that their issues are the most important.
As one commentator famously put it, “parties do not debate positions on a
single issue, but try instead to make end runs around each other on different
issues.”42 As a result, candidates have an incentive to promote legal or

views such as repealing of “Obamacare,” protecting the Defense of Marriage Act, and
making the Bush era tax cuts permanent); Social Issues, FOCUS ON FAMILY,
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/socialissues/social-issues.aspx (last visited June 19, 2012)
(advocating for, among other things, the disempowerment of “activist judges,” bans on
abortions, and heightened protection of religious freedom); cf. Christopher Raymond, The
Continued Salience of Religious Voting in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain, 30
ELECTORAL STUD. 125, 127 (2011) (“A large part of what makes religious voters so tempting
as a base of conservative political support is that their social values tend to correspond with
conservative political values, which in turn facilitates conservative party identification and
voting.”).
40
See Political Party Platforms: 2008 Democratic Party Platform, supra note 30.
41
Political Party Platforms: 2008 Republican Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545.
42
William H. Riker, Introduction to AGENDA FORMATION 1, 4 (William H. Riker ed.,
1993).
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institutional arrangements that emphasize issues they own or that
deemphasize issues associated with their political opposition. Thus, rather
than try to persuade voters that they offer better policy options across a
whole swath of issue areas, partisan candidates will attempt to make the
policy problems associated with the issues they own “the programmatic
meaning of the election and the criteria by which voters make their
choice.”43
In the United States, Democrats and Republicans have developed
distinct reputations among the electorate for handling a range of foreign and
domestic policy issues, which are likely to have a direct effect on the
preferences of both parties for placing certain issues on their campaign
agendas.44 Generally, Republicans have cultivated a better reputation for
handling matters of national security, illicit drugs, crime, and so-called
family values issues, while Democrats have an electoral advantage in
economic redistribution and social welfare.45 Consequently, we should
expect Democrats to have a greater incentive than Republicans to place
issues related to championing the weak against the strong on the policy
agenda, especially if they suspect doing so will shore up the base and also
appeal to swing voters.46 On the other hand, conservative governments or
Republicans, who voters associate with strong national security and probusiness policies, are not likely to be credible if they advocate aggressive
human rights policies abroad.47 Since voters are aware that an aggressive
posture towards global human rights is unlikely to be consistent with the
preferences of core Republican constituencies, voters are likely going to
discount the credibility of a Republican candidate’s promise to promote
human rights abroad.
Nonetheless, Democrats will only have an incentive to devote
significant political capital to the expansion of human rights through
judicial entrenchment when certain political conditions are ripe. After all,
both swing voters and key Democratic constituencies may deem the
aggressive promotion of human rights as an idealistic distraction that
conflicts with other more important foreign and domestic policy objectives.
Thus, a Democratic administration that is otherwise ideologically
43

Petrocik, supra note 29, at 828 (emphasis omitted).
See Petrocik et al., supra note 29, at 599.
45
Id. at 608–09.
46
Id. at 601–02; Belanger & Meguid, supra note 32, at 478 (pointing out that parties
“tend to strategically emphasize those issues on which they are perceived (at least for the
moment) to be more competent”).
47
See Helmut Norpoth & Bruce Buchanan, Wanted: The Education President: Issue
Trespassing by Political Candidates, 56 PUB. OPINION Q. 87, 98 (1992) (arguing that an
issue-trespassing strategy “runs the risk of raising issues where familiar party images
strongly favor the opposing party. At best, voters may simply ignore the issue; at worst, they
may vote for the opponent.”).
44
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predisposed towards promoting human rights may, nonetheless, seek to
downplay those issues if it believes that it will conflict with its objectives of
obtaining political power. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a
Democratic administration is most likely going to champion human rights
aggressively when doing so has obvious electoral benefits. The electoral
benefits to a Democratic administration of pursuing an international human
rights agenda is likely to be most pronounced when it can be used to cast
disrepute on the foreign policy of a prior Republican administration. This is
especially true when the prior administration is associated with an amoral
foreign policy approach that has either become politically controversial or
unpopular. Simply put, support for human rights can be used by a
Democratic administration as part of a strategic effort to paint a prior
Republican administration as being either complicit or indifferent to
widespread human rights abuses in foreign countries.
B. The Strategic Role of Courts in Foreign Affairs: Political Entrenchment
Having discussed the nature of partisan division over foreign policy
issues like human rights, the next relevant issue is how parties might seek to
use other institutional actors to entrench their political preferences. There is
a growing literature that explores how various institutions can be exploited
instrumentally by political actors for self-interested purposes. Such an
instrumental approach towards institutions features prominently in accounts
exploring partisan preferences for the decentralization of authority,
independent judiciaries, electoral systems, and the choice of presidency
versus parliamentary systems.48 That approach assumes that politicians will
choose among alternative institutional arrangements with an eye towards
the electoral or policy outcome each arrangement is likely to produce. At
bottom, we would expect self-interested politicians to anticipate both
threats and opportunities from new institutional arrangements and then take
actions to decrease the risks that such arrangements would either undermine
their policy preferences or cause them to lose office.
In the context of judicial empowerment, certain conditions have to be
in place for political actors to consider the judiciary a valuable vehicle for
political entrenchment. As some commentators have observed, delegation
of authority to courts is more likely to occur when the current composition
of the judiciary is considered ideologically sympathetic to the objectives of
the governing coalition.49 Since the post-WWII era, progressive public
48

See Kenneth Benoit, Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the
Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 363 (2007) (surveying
the literature); Thomas F. Remington & Steven S. Smith, Political Goals, Uncertainty,
Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary
Election Law, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1253 (1996).
49
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 27 (observing that elected officials “may favor the
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interest groups fighting for changes in government policy on civil rights,
environmental protection, and prisoners’ rights have generally found courts
to be hospitable vehicles for advancing their policy preferences.50 Some
scholars have suggested that the Warren Court focused its efforts on
striking down Jim Crow era state legislation in the South when such
legislation was out of step with the prevailing national sentiment.51 But
whether such strategies have been successful is a point of contention in the
public law literature. As Gerald Rosenberg has argued, for instance, the
belief by progressive elites in the 1950s and the 1960s that the federal
courts could be used to achieve substantive social change proved to be
largely illusory.52 Nonetheless, progressive human rights groups have
sought to use courts to effect changes in American foreign policy with
respect to human rights, but it was only with the 1980 Filártiga case that
they achieved a favorable judicial response that has withstood political
backlash from other power holders.
In the context of international human rights, there are additional
reasons to expect that delegating more authority to the courts will be
valuable to a governing coalition that is sympathetic to the substantive
agenda of the human rights movement. First, outside the judiciary, the
options for political entrenchment of international human rights policies by
elected officials are limited. In the United States, for instance, the
executive branch has significant latitude in interpreting the scope of
obligations under existing international legal commitments.53 In this
active exercise of constitutional review by a sympathetic judiciary”).
50
See Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule
24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 281 (1990) (“Over the years, [public interest groups] have
grown dramatically in number and in political power, and they have turned to the courts to
pursue objectives unachievable through political processes.”); Paul Burstein, Legal
Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity,
96 AM. J. SOC. 1201, 1204 (1991) (“[L]itigation has been an important part of the repertoire
of those seeking equal opportunity, at least since the NAACP began its campaign against
segregation in the 1930’s.”).
51
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 27, at 588 (observing that “the Warren Court
primarily targeted those states and interests who [sic] were resistant to national cultural and
political trends”).
52
See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (questioning whether the U.S. Supreme Court is able to bring about
widespread social change).
53
There is a rich debate in the literature about to what extent, if any, courts should defer
to the President’s interpretation of international law. Nonetheless, as a descriptive matter,
most commentators agree that courts do accord substantial deference. See Bradley, supra
note 15, at 662 (“[M]atters labeled ‘political questions’ often are instances of judiciallypermitted executive branch lawmaking.”); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference:
The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1752–58
(2007) (examining the practical impact of the deference doctrine); Derek Jinks & Neal
Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1236–38 (2007)
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picture, presidents may strategically decide to interpret an international
legal commitment expansively if it promotes their partisan preferences, or
to interpret it very narrowly otherwise. Thus, even if one administration
adopts an expansive view of what particular treaties or customary
international law norms require in the context of human rights, there is no
guarantee that a successive administration will also adopt the same, or even
a similar, view. Even beyond the question of broad executive discretion in
foreign policy, another significant domestic institutional barrier to partisan
entrenchment of international human rights is the fragmented nature of
American political authority.54 In other words, institutional structures like
federalism make it difficult for presidents or members of Congress to
impose an expansive vision of human rights directly on the American
people. Since much of the formal authority over social policy in the United
States is vested directly in the states that are likely to have heterogeneous
preferences regarding human rights, it is not clear that any executive branch
mandate to enforce human rights norm would have much traction. Thus,
the judiciary may serve a useful vehicle for overcoming resistance by statelevel officials to the national imposition of progressive human rights
policies, especially in those states where the preferences of dominant local
politicians may be significantly out of step with that of the national
governing coalition.
Second, in the midst of electoral uncertainty, courts may be a
particularly valuable tool for locking in policy outcomes, especially when
an administration is aware that its political adversaries will have an
incentive to reverse course once they come into power.55 In this scenario,
the politics of judicial appointments assures a Democratic administration at
least a plausible chance of finding some sympathetic judges who may be
willing to ensure that the administration’s human rights vision remains part
of the future political agenda regardless of who gets elected. Moreover, the
(examining the contexts in which courts will defer to Executive Branch determinations of
foreign policy); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 194–99
(2006) (offering rebuttal to Justice Stevens’s opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld); Nzelibe,
supra note 21, at 980 (exploring the institutional competency of courts with respect to
allocations of foreign affairs power); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing
Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1175–78 & nn.10–17 (2007) (examining the
executive’s power relative to judicial international relations doctrines); David Sloss, Judicial
Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 497–99 (2007) (contrasting the deference to the Executive Branch
in the decades before Hamdan v. Rumsfeld with the zero-deference approach of courts in the
early nineteenth century).
54
See generally Moravcsik, supra note 38 (describing how conservatives use the
fragmented constitutional structure to oppose human rights treaties in the United States).
55
For a broad statement of this political insurance argument, see TOM GINSBURG,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003).
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possible downside of judicial empowerment to a pro-human rights
administration is very little, since unsympathetic judges do not ordinarily
have the institutional capacity to entrench an anti-human rights agenda. In
the context of judicial enforcement of ATS claims, for instance, the worstcase scenario is that an unsympathetic court may decline enforcement or
decide the case adversely on the facts, in which case policy discretion over
how to handle the relevant human rights dispute reverts back to the political
branches, in other words, the status quo. In this picture, the partisan effect
of expansive judicial oversight in international human rights is structurally
asymmetric because it provides an administration with a progressive agenda
an opportunity to improve on the status quo and, in the alternative, to do no
worse than the status quo. For instance, a specific administration could
plausibly decide to take a more aggressive stance on human policy against a
foreign government regardless of the outcome of an ATS dispute.
However, an administration that prefers a much more conciliatory approach
to a foreign regime accused of human rights violations might find its
flexibility constrained by an adverse judicial determination against the
regime.
In sum, a key distinction between conventional political insurance
explanations of judicial empowerment and the one offered here is that the
veil of ignorance underlying judicial empowerment in this framework is
pretty thin. In the traditional political insurance argument, developed in
large part by Tom Ginsburg, two or more parties of equal strength operating
under a veil of ignorance may favor judicial empowerment as a hedge
against the possible loss of office.56 By contrast, in this framework the
effect of the empowerment of the court to resolve human rights
controversies is usually favored by only the party that seeks a more
aggressive stance on human rights enforcement. Provided that the prohuman rights preferences by a specific party are fixed over multiple
electoral periods, judicial empowerment may become an unambiguous
windfall for that party. On the other hand, for a party opposed to a more
aggressive global human rights agenda, judicial empowerment is likely to
be a one-sided cost with little or no countervailing political benefits.

56
See id. at 243 (“[South Korea’s] 1987 constitutional design reflected the deep political
uncertainty faced by three political forces of roughly equal strength. No party could
confidently predict it would win power . . . . A system of constitutional review served the
interests of all parties under such uncertain conditions, and the design of the court provided it
with institutional resources to expand its power.”); see also J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling
(In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 722 (1994)
(discussing the role of partisan competition for judicial independence); Matthew C.
Stephenson, “When The Devil Turns”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial
Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 72–73 (2003) (same).
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IV. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE UNEVEN TRAJECTORY OF ALIEN
TORT LITIGATION
In perusing the legal literature, there is a dearth of studies investigating
the ideological and political roots of the judicial revival of litigation under
the ATS in the late 1970s. Some of the literature hints at the politically
charged environment surrounding the 1980 Filártiga decision.57 There has,
however, hardly been any systematic account of why ATS litigation
emerged specifically during that period, or why subsequent administrations
and certain judges initially took widely divergent positions on enforcing
ATS claims. Subpart IV.A attempts to outline and explore the political
logic of the Carter Administration’s receptivity toward judicial enforcement
of human rights in the 1970s. Subpart IV.B then illustrates the uneven
trajectory of ATS litigation in the federal courts, including the increasing
conservative backlash that resulted once certain courts embraced a novel
aiding and abetting claim that allowed plaintiffs to bring ATS claims
against domestic and foreign corporations.
A. The Origins: Carter’s Human Rights Agenda and the Judicial Revival of
ATS.
For a statute that has elicited so much controversy among
contemporary commentators, the ATS is remarkably terse. In its entirety,
the statute simply states that federal courts will have “original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
laws of nations or a treaty of the United States.”58 In many respects, it is
the very ambiguity of the ATS’s terse wording that has provided much of
the fodder for the modern partisan conflict over the role of human rights
litigation in domestic courts.
Four different developments converged in 1980 to make the ATS a
vehicle for achieving the judicial entrenchment of a progressive vision of
57
See PETER HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 47 (2009) (“By the
1960s, it was generally agreed that a nation’s treatment of its own citizens was covered by
international law . . . . By 1980 there was a growing international consensus that the nations
of the world had a responsibility to ensure that the terrible events that had occurred should
never happen again.”); Jerome J. Shestack, Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S.
Foreign Policy, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 17, 20 (1989) (“By the 1970s, the
world had changed considerably since WWII. Rough military parity had been established
between the two superpowers. The number of participants in the international order had
multiplied, and their ability to affect each other had extended. We were moving from a
bipolar to a multipolar society in which the global agenda was diverse and complicated. At
least, by the early 1970s, compelling reasons had arisen to validate the proposition that a
strong human rights policy would serve our national interest.”).
58
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
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global human rights. First, the 1976 presidential elections ushered in a
government that had a strong ideological commitment to a progressive
human rights agenda and was aware that the issue of human rights could be
used to burnish the credentials of the Democratic Party and discredit that of
the Republican opposition.59 Second, largely because of entrenched
Republican congressional resistance, the Carter Administration faced
significant obstacles in advancing its human rights agenda in the legislative
arena.60 Third, a well-developed coalition of progressive rights advocacy
organizations that could mobilize resources and provide support for impact
litigation was already in place during that time period.61 Fourth, there were
federal judges who were sufficiently sympathetic to a progressive vision of
human rights and who were willing to accept the executive branch’s
invitation to engage in doctrinal innovation in this area.
To understand the Carter Administration’s turn toward a more
aggressive approach to human rights, it is necessary to explore the broader
political context. When Carter emerged as the decisive victor in the 1976
presidential elections, the Republicans had been tarred not only by the
Watergate controversy, but also by a growing congressional backlash
against the amoral realism associated with Nixon’s foreign policy.62 In this
59
See, e.g., MARY E. STUCKEY, JIMMY CARTER, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NATIONAL
AGENDA 55 (2008) (“For Carter human rights would restore integrity to government
practices and thus would also restore citizen trust in government. What the Republicans had
ripped apart, Democrats would reunite.”).
60
SCOTT KAUFMAN, PLANS UNRAVELED: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION 31 (2008) (“Turning to Congress did not guarantee success. Republicans
tended to disapprove of actions that threatened U.S. relations with right-wing, anticommunist governments.”).
61
See, e.g., Kenneth Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United
States, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1231, 1234, 1240 (1999) (“In the years just prior to the Carter
presidency, there was a phenomenal burst of human rights activism in the United States . . . .
Dozens of new [human rights] groups started up . . . and the few human rights organizations
that already existed grew exponentially. Established foundations and church groups began
devoting attention to the topic . . . . They were building international research and activist
networks that would be a counterweight to entrenched defenders of national sovereignty.”).
As some commentators have observed, the shift occasioned by the Filartiga decision toward
the idea of domestically enforced human rights obligations was relatively significant and
swift. See Austen L. Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1099, 1100, 1116 (2011) (“What is astonishing in this evolution is how, in a very short
span of time, a change in mindset occurred. Before the 1980s, the idea that foreign nationals
could sue or be sued in domestic courts for conduct abroad was almost unheard of.”).
62
See KAUFMAN, supra note 60, at 11 (“The ‘imperial presidency,’ in which much of the
U.S. government’s power rested in the hands of the chief executive, had begun to disappear.
Americans reacted not just to Vietnam but to the Watergate scandal by electing 75 new faces
to Congress in 1974.”); STUCKEY, supra note 59, at 17 (“As badly as Watergate and Vietnam
had divided the country, a clear commitment to human rights had the potential to bridge the
various fissures that the previous decade had widened—among members of opposing parties,
ideologies, and generations.”).
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political climate, partisan considerations coincided with principles to
convince the Democrats that pushing human rights aggressively was not
only appropriate, but also electorally prudent.63
By the late 1970s, the issue of human rights was used not only to
galvanize important loyal constituencies in the Democratic Party, but also
to discredit the Republic opposition. Thus, despite the occasional
invocations to foreign policy bipartisanship, the White House constantly
sought to paint the Republican opposition as apologists for the worst human
rights abuses of American allies during the Vietnam War era. In a key
Democratic fundraising event, for instance, President Carter made an
explicit connection between the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy
agenda and Watergate:
As you well know, our nation has been deeply wounded in the last
few years. The war in Vietnam . . . brought the condemnation of
most of the rest of the World on our Nation. We have been
embarrassed by the Watergate revelations and by the CIA
investigations. There was a sense of malaise and a sense of
discouragement and a sense of distrust of our own Government, a
sense of betrayal of the fine ideals on which our country was
founded. But I think it’s accurate to say that a strong emphasis on
human rights and every aspect of them has restored to our people a
pride again.64

The Carter Administration also sought to draw parallels between the
Republican and Democratic views on foreign policy and the parties’
different positions on polarizing domestic issues like civil rights.65 But in
all these contexts, the administration’s message was clear: By fixing the
foreign policy damage wrought by the Nixon Administration and restoring
America’s stature in the world, the Democrats would not only demonstrate
63

See STUCKEY, supra note 59, at 17.
Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee
Fundraising Dinner, Los Angeles, California (Oct. 22, 1977), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JIMMY CARTER 1977, at 1895–96 (1978).
65
For instance, in a 1979 Washington, D.C. speech, Carter announced:
64

Our concern with human rights, which is a foundation of the Democratic Party,
begins here at home. We’ve chipped away at decades of neglect, and we’ve tried
to root out examples of blatant prejudice. We’ve placed minorities, qualified in
every way, in many decision-making jobs in the Federal Government . . . . We’ve
brought more minorities and more women into our judicial system than in all the
rest of American history combined. And we are not through yet.
Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner, Democratic National Committee (Sept. 26, 1979), in 2
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JIMMY CARTER 1979, at 1769
(1980).
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their human rights credentials, but also raise doubts about those of the
Republican Party.66
Initially, Carter moved quickly to make good on his commitment to
pursue an aggressive human rights policy on the legislative and
bureaucratic fronts. He signed the controversial U.N. Convention on
Human Rights, as well as the American Convention on Human Rights, and
transmitted a total of four different human rights conventions (including
two others signed by previous administrations) to the Senate for
ratification.67
But Carter’s legislative agenda later ran into a number of obstacles.
First, gains by conservatives during the 1978 midterm election significantly
dampened Congress’s initial enthusiasm to make international human rights
a priority.68 Indeed, strong opposition by Republican members of Congress
thwarted Carter’s initiatives to get a single human rights treaty ratified
during his term in office.69 At bottom, conservative activists and their allies
in the Senate tended to view the U.N. human rights treaties as a ploy by
left-leaning groups to impose a progressive agenda on the rest of the
country.70 In hindsight, as other commentators have observed, these
concerns were not entirely unfounded.71 After all, many of these U.N.
treaties would have touched on many core domestic issues in which there
was increasing polarization between the left and right, including criminal
punishment, national security, family values, social and economic rights,
religion, gender discrimination, and capital punishment. Second, beyond
the conservative Republican backlash on Capitol Hill, President Carter also
had to contend with resistance from career bureaucrats at the State
Department.
These bureaucrats viewed the administration’s strong
emphasis on human rights as a threat to the influence of the regional
bureaus, which sometimes had to work closely with foreign regimes that
had poor human rights track records.72 In sharp contrast with Congress and

66

As Mary Stuckey observed in her study of the human rights agenda during the 1970s,
President Carter took the position that, “The Democrats thus represented the best of the
nation’s practices and beliefs, which could be understood as his signature policy: human
rights.” STUCKEY, supra note 59, at 56.
67
See id. at 117.
68
See KAUFMAN, supra note 60, at 117–18.
69
See STUCKEY, supra note 59, at 111 (Carter “failed to get any of [the treaties] ratified
due to conservative fears that they would diminish U.S. sovereignty and impinge on the U.S.
Constitution . . . . Congress was a key barrier to implementing human rights
internationally”).
70
See Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization: International Law as an Extension of
Domestic Political Conflict, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 635, 670–71 (2011).
71
See Moravcsik, supra note 38, at 150 (describing conservative opposition to human
rights treaties in the United States).
72
See JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 30
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the State Department, the courts proved to be more receptive to Carter’s
human rights agenda. Because of congressional opposition, President
Carter did not have much in the way of new legislation that he could use to
fortify his human rights agenda in the courts. The political climate proved
favorable, however, for judicial revival of the long dormant ATS.
Certain factors in the late-1970s made it more likely that domestic
courts could operate with a considerable degree of autonomy in
resuscitating the ATS and adjudicating human rights disputes. Most
importantly, there was already a strong network of advocacy coalitions in
place consisting of public interest groups, law professors, elected members
of Congress, and journalists who were not only willing to coordinate efforts
to pursue a human rights agenda in the political arena but also before the
courts.73
In the context of the judicial revival of ATS, the advocacy organization
that proved to be most instrumental was the New York based Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR), a progressive outfit that was founded in 1966
to pursue aggressive litigation strategies in support of civil rights.74
Nonetheless, when the CCR attorneys first agreed to represent Joel and
Dolly Filártiga in their claims against a Paraguayan police officer who
allegedly tortured their son and brother, they did not have much reason to
expect, based upon existing precedent, that any court would agree to review
the case on the merits.75 After all, besides the CCR, other civil rights
groups had previously attempted to secure domestic enforcement of
international human rights law in courts during the 1950s and 1960s, but
without much success.76
By the late-1970s, there were hardly any significant changes either in
the case law or in the composition of the judiciary that made it more likely
any court would agree to hear the case.77 More importantly, the relevant
(2d ed. 2008) (observing that “clashes between the staff of the human rights and geographic
bureaus were frequent, particularly over Latin America”).
73
See, e.g., Cmiel, supra note 61, at 1234–36 (chronicling the rise, both in numbers and
in power, of various human rights advocacy groups such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch in the 1970s, along with a growing interest in human rights among
many members of Congress, leading to an explosion of reported information about human
rights violations).
74
See
Mission
and
History,
CTR.
FOR
CONST.
RTS.,
http://www.ccrjustice.org/missionhistory (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (touting its “creative
use of law as a positive force for social change” and “daring and innovative legal strategies
which have produced many important precedents”).
75
See RICHARD ALAN WHITE, BREAKING SILENCE: THE CASE THAT CHANGED THE FACE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 213 (2004) (observing that CCR attorneys “felt that [a suit brought under
the ATS] would be laughed out of court”).
76
See Howard Tolley, Jr., Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human Rights, 105 POL.
SCI. Q. 617, 619–20 (1990–1991).
77
See WHITE, supra note 75, at 235–37 (recounting the early procedural history of the
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U.N. human rights treaties that had specified violations of the laws of
nations had not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. Even among progressive
public interest groups, however, the CCR had a reputation for being a
particularly aggressive outfit that was often willing to take cases in which
the chances of success on the merits were fairly slim.78 Not surprisingly,
despite what seemed like favorable facts in Filartiga, including the brutality
of the alleged actions and the presence of the defendant in the United States,
the federal district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter in a
terse opinion that largely recited existing case law.79
When the CCR attorneys decided to appeal the district court’s
decision, however, they found a much more sympathetic audience in the
Second Circuit, especially in the person of Judge Irving Kaufman. As a
Democratic appointee who was elevated to the Second Circuit by President
Kennedy, Judge Kaufman already had some familiarity with the U.N. and
international law; indeed, as a federal district judge, he had served as one of
the American representatives to the Second U.N. Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.80 The other members
on the panel were Judge Amalya Kearse, a Carter appointee who was
affiliated with the Executive Committee of the Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law;81 and Wilfred Feinberg, who was a Johnson
appointee.82 Writing for the court, Judge Kaufman reasoned that, despite
the absence of governing language in the treaty, international human rights
law could also be found in “the works of jurists, writing professedly on
public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”83

Filártiga case and the host of rejections that the CCR attorneys encountered in their attempts
to have a court accept jurisdiction under the ATS).
78
See HENNER, supra note 57, at 48 (recounting the CCR’s “long history of advocating
for social justice and human rights” as well as its attempts to utilize the then-unpopular ATS
as a vehicle to “vindicate international human rights in U.S. courts”).
79
See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala 630 F.2d 876, 879–80 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the
“district judge recognized the strength of” [Filártiga’s] argument,” but “felt constrained by
dicta contained in two recent [Second Circuit] opinions . . . to construe narrowly ‘the law of
nations’”).
80
See Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, London, U.K., Aug. 8–19, 1960, Report Prepared by the Secretariat 72, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.17/20 (Aug. 20, 1960).
81
Amalya
Kearse,
JUST
THE
BEGINNING
FOUND.,
http://www.jtbf.org/index.php?src=directory&view=biographies&srctype=detail&refno=13
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
82
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Feinberg, Wilfred, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=742&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013).
83
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820)).
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Applying these other sources of law, Judge Kaufman concluded that an
“act of torture committed by a state official against one held in detention
violated established norms of the international law of human rights, and
hence the law of nations.”84 Judge Kaufman understood his decision
represented a significant shift in the legal landscape, but he seemed to
embrace the role of a judicial maverick pushing for global social change.
“Our holding today,” he declared, “giving effect to a jurisdictional
provision enacted by the First Congress, is a small but important step in the
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”85
However, while a strong human rights movement and a sympathetic
judiciary were undoubtedly important for revitalizing the ATS as a tool of
human rights enforcement, they were hardly sufficient. Judicial willingness
to expand into this delicate realm became politically palatable only when
the executive branch was on board. To understand the importance of
executive branch support in this dynamic, some historical context is
necessary. In hindsight, Judge Kaufman’s soaring rhetoric notwithstanding,
his decision in Filártiga turned out not to be particularly unprecedented.
Indeed, courts had previously attempted to rely on the U.N. Charter and
other international U.N. Conventions to enforce human rights
domestically.86 In the immediate post-WWII era, for instance, federal and
state courts across the country were inundated with amicus briefs in a wide
range of civil rights controversies that invoked both draft U.N. Human
Rights Conventions and the U.N. Charter.87
Initially, some courts in the post-WWII era seemed receptive to these
internationalist arguments.88 Indeed, in at least one decision, Sei Fujii v.
State,89 the California Supreme Court explicitly relied upon the U.N.
Charter as one of the grounds for striking down a portion of the California
Alien Land Law.
However, this post-war judicial alliance with
international human rights agreements eventually ended after a severe and
protracted political backlash that almost culminated in an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. The proposed amendment championed by Senator
Bricker, Republican of Ohio, would have rooted out the possibility of using
84

Id.
Id. at 889.
86
See generally Richard B. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting
International Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153 (1979).
87
For a detailed discussion of the approaches of courts and litigants to U.N. human
rights agreements, see Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States
Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984).
88
See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948) (“[T]his nation has recently
pledged itself, through the United Nations Charter, to promote respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language and religion.”).
89
242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
85
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treaties to create binding domestic human rights law by requiring that a
treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only
through legislation “which would be valid in the absence of the treaty.”90 In
the end, the Bricker Amendment movement eventually fizzled out after
President Eisenhower promised that none of the proposed U.N. human
rights covenants would ever be ratified during his administration.91 By the
mid-1950s, however, courts were overtly distancing themselves from the
notion—embraced by human rights activists and certain legal scholars—
that the U.N. Charter could be construed as a legally binding document in
domestic civil rights controversies.92
So what was the difference between Filártiga in 1980 and the human
rights controversies of the 1950s? First, unlike the mid-1950s, when
President Eisenhower opposed the use of courts to vindicate global human
rights norms, the Carter Administration embraced the position eventually
adopted by Judge Kaufman in Filártiga. In its amicus submission before
the Second Circuit, the Carter Administration not only argued that the U.N.
Charter “represent[ed] a clear break with the traditional view that a nation’s
treatment of its citizens is beyond the concern of international law,” but also
concluded that “not every case which touches upon foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance . . . . Like many other areas affecting
international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is not
committed exclusively to the political branches of government.”93 Thus,
overt support by the Carter Administration meant that many of the
90

FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE “BRICKER” AMENDMENT 27 (1954). Ostensibly, the
import of the amendment language was to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and guarantee the maintenance of those domestic
institutional barriers which were making it difficult to pass federal legislation. Id.
91
See HOLMAN, supra note 90, at 36. More specifically, Secretary Dulles stated during
congressional hearings:
[W]hile we shall not withhold our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or
covenant on human rights, we do not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means
which we would now select as the proper and most effective way to spread
throughout the world the goals of human liberty to which this Nation has been
dedicated since its inception. We therefore do not intend to become a party to any
such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate.
Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before the
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953); see also Editorial
Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 348–49 (1995) (“To help defeat the [Bricker] amendment, the
Eisenhower administration promised that the United States would not accede to international
human rights covenants or conventions.”).
92
See, e.g., Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955); Vlissidis v.
Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1959).
93
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2, at 22.
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perceived institutional risks associated with judicial intervention into this
erstwhile politically charged terrain were muted.94 However, despite its
supportive invocation of the U.N. Charter, the government’s submission in
Filártiga did not reference the backlash that met prior judicial efforts to cite
the U.N. Charter and other U.N. human rights covenants during the late
1940s and early 1950s. Neither did it discuss the subsequent Supreme
Court decisions from the mid-1950s that had repudiated reliance on the
U.N. Charter as a source of binding positive law in civil rights lawsuits.95
Second, from a distributive perspective, the political stakes involved in
adjudicating the early ATS disputes were not that significant. Unlike
during the 1950s human rights controversies, there were few, if any,
domestic interest groups aligned with either party that perceived the revival
of the ATS as a threat to their ideological or electoral objectives. After all,
the only identifiable individuals who would have been obviously affected
by the early ATS cases were certain current or former foreign government
officials who might be served with process if they visited the United States.
Even in those situations, the benefits to victims and human rights groups (or
costs imposed on foreign defendants) have often turned out to be more
symbolic than concrete. Thus, despite often rendering default judgments
awarding significant sums of money to victims in the early ATS cases,
collection on these judgments almost never occurred.96 For instance, the
defendant in Filártiga returned to Paraguay and the $10.4 million judgment
against him was never collected.97 More often than not, these early ATS
cases ended up proving to be hollow victories for both the victims and
advocacy groups dedicated to promoting human rights.

94

Indeed, the Filártiga court quoted approvingly one of President Carter’s speeches on
human rights in which he observed that “no member of the United Nations can claim that
mistreatment of the citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its
responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in
any part of the world.” Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 n. 24 (2d Cir. 1980)
(quoting President James Carter, Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, Human
Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy, Address Before the United Nations General
Assembly Hall (Mar. 17, 1977), in DEP’T ST. BULL. 329 (Apr. 1977), at 332).
95
See supra notes 86, 92 and accompanying text.
96
See HENNER, supra note 57, at 244 (“ATS cases are usually unsuccessful in obtaining
monetary damages, and in those very few cases where damages have been collected, it has
only been after many years of litigation.”); George Norris Stavis, Note, Collecting
Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases—Flexibility for Non-Profit Litigators?, 31 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 215–16 (1999) (“Regardless of the cause, an Alien Tort Claims Act
victory in a United States court is the tip of the iceberg: successful collection has thus far
evaded all plaintiffs.”).
97
See WHITE, supra note 75, at 281.
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B. The Post-Filártiga Trajectory: The Conservative Pushback Against the
Aiding and Abetting Cases
While Republican administrations since Reagan have been consistently
lukewarm towards the judicial revival of the ATS, conservative opposition
to adjudication under the statute became most pronounced and strident
under the presidency of President George W. Bush in the early 2000s. I
argue that the expansion of the target of ATS lawsuits to include American
and foreign corporations as well as the onset of the war on terrorism helped
to mobilize conservative domestic constituencies who now viewed the ATS
not only as a hindrance to foreign policy flexibility, but also as a threat to
their material and cultural interests.
1. Lukewarm Conservative Opposition to ATS Based on Foreign Policy:
1980–1993
Despite the low stakes in the early ATS cases, the pendulum quickly
swung away from interest in human rights enforcement when the Reagan
Administration came into power in 1980.98 In his 1980 campaign, for
instance, Reagan attempted to forge a foreign policy agenda that was clearly
distinct from that of his predecessor.99
Ironically, in stressing a
fundamental reversal of course in foreign policy, the narrative deployed by
the Republicans in 1980 echoed the one used by Carter against the Nixon
and Ford Administrations four years earlier. The 1980 Republican Platform
declared:
Never before in modern history has the United States endured as

98

Ernest Lefever, like other academics such as Ernst Haas and Stanley Hoffman,
denounced the Carter human rights policy as wrongheaded: “[W]e cannot export human
rights . . . in dealing with Third World countries, their foreign policy behavior should be the
determining factor, not their domestic practices.” Human Rights and US Foreign Policy:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l. Orgs. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th
Cong. 230–231 (1979) (statement of Ernest Lefever), reprinted in JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, THE
UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JIMMY CARTER AND THE DILEMMAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY xvii
(1986).
99
The 1980 Republican Party Platform pronounced:
For three and one-half years, the Carter Administration has been without a
coherent strategic concept to guide foreign policy, oblivious to the scope and
magnitude of the threat posed to our security, and devoid of competence to provide
leadership and direction to the free world. The Administration’s conduct of foreign
policy has undermined our friends abroad, and led our meet [sic] dangerous
adversaries to miscalculate the willingness of the American people to resist
aggression. Republicans support a policy of peace through strength; weakness
provokes aggression.
Political Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1980, supra note 31.
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many humiliations, insults, and defeats as it has during the past four
years: our ambassadors murdered, our embassies burned, our
warnings ignored, our diplomacy scorned, our diplomats kidnapped.
The Carter Administration has shown that it neither understands
totalitarianism nor appreciates the way tyrants take advantage of
weakness.100

Once he assumed office, Reagan quickly attempted to distance himself
from Carter’s focus on human rights. Indeed, his first nominee for Chief
Human Rights Officer was Ernest Lefever, an academic who was openly
critical of Carter’s approach to human rights.101 Ultimately, however,
Reagan did not succeed in achieving the clean break with Carter’s legacy as
his efforts to deemphasize human rights received significant pushback from
the Democratic majority in Congress.102 As various commentators have
suggested, although the Carter Administration first encountered resistance
to his agenda from the State Department bureaucracy, by the end of his term
in office, human rights had become partially ingrained in the State
Department’s mission.103 In the end, while retaining some of the rhetoric
and institutional trappings of the human rights agenda established by Carter,
Reagan decided to deploy such rhetoric and trappings to a largely narrow
end—an attack on the human rights policies of communist bloc countries.104
100

Id.
See supra note 86; Ernest W. Lefever, United States, Japan, and the Defense of the
Pacific, 6 POL. REV. 89, 90 (1978) (“President Jimmy Carter’s efforts to develop a new
foreign policy consensus have been singularly unsuccessful, partly because he does not
understand the roots of the old alliance against communist expansion, and partly because he
appears to be a vacillating victim of conflicting staff advice. On the deepest level, Mr.
Carter gives the impression of being profoundly confused about America’s external
responsibilities . . . .”).
102
See MERTUS, supra note 72, at 31–32 (observing that after taking office, Reagan
attempted to “rein in the human rights work of the State Department . . . . The Lefever
nomination proved to be a wake-up call on human rights for the Reagan administration.
Having underestimated the support for human rights both within and outside government,
the administration was surprised when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected
Lefever’s nomination with a vote of thirteen to four”).
103
See, e.g., id. at 33 (“The Reagan administration reoriented the human rights agenda by
recognizing . . . American exceptionalism throughout . . . . By the end of Reagan’s second
term . . . human rights were accepted as an important component of the American national
interest.”) (internal quotations omitted).
104
See, e.g., id. at 32 (observing that Elliot Abrams, Reagan’s assistant secretary of the
Bureau of Human Rights, “seized upon human rights as a useful tool for promoting his own
anticommunist ideological agenda in Latin American and the Caribbean . . . . The selfserving manner in which Abrams used human rights to advance public policy goals is
characteristic of the entire Reagan administration”); cf. Betty Glad, Black and White
Thinking: Ronald Reagan’s Approach to Foreign Policy, 4 POL. PSYCHOL. 33, 44 (1983)
(commenting that Reagan’s foreign policy was perhaps inconsistent in its condoning of
human rights abuses by nations that were allied with the U.S. against the “Soviet
101
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While both the Reagan and the elder Bush Administrations opposed
the proliferation of ATS litigation as an unwarranted judicial interference
with the executive branch’s prerogative in foreign affairs, early partisan
opposition to judicial enforcement was hardly strident or sustained. Prior to
1996, ATS disputes were still targeting foreign officials almost exclusively,
and from a political perspective the stakes were still relatively low.105
Nonetheless, both administrations were sufficiently concerned that a
proliferation of such suits could constitute a threat to American foreign
policy objectives. The Reagan Administration filed an amicus brief in the
Ninth Circuit Trajano case, opposing claims brought by Philippine citizens
alleging torture and wrongful death against former Philippine President
Ferdinand Marcos.106 And while the Administration of George H.W. Bush
did not file any amicus brief in ATS actions, it expressed opposition to
judicial enforcement of the extraterritorial torts against foreign officials in
congressional testimony.107 Nonetheless, the first formal legislative
response to ATS litigation, the passage of the Torture Victims Protection
Act (TVPA),108 actually took place during the elder Bush’s Administration.
Moreover, while the Clinton Administration was noticeably less strident
than Carter’s in pursuing a human rights agenda, it filed statements of
interest supporting litigation on the merits in Kadic v. Karadzic and Doe v.
Unocal.109

challenge”).
105
See Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s
Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 177 (2004) (pointing
out that prior to recent developments in ATS jurisprudence, which has seen suits filed
against corporations, foreign officials, and the United States itself, “the executive branch
took a hands-off position throughout the 1990s, apparently maintaining the view, formally
expressed in the Filártiga litigation, that private litigation to vindicate international human
rights does not harm U.S. foreign policy or other national interests”); Beth Stephens,
Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 773–74 (2008)
(observing that following the 1996 Unocal decision, where corporate liability under the ATS
was upheld, the Bush Administration began filing amicus briefs in ATS cases because
“litigation could undermine important U.S. foreign policy interests, including national
security”).
106
Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4.
107
The Administration’s opposition to the notion of aliens bringing tort claims against
foreign officials was expressed during congressional hearings on the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA), although it is worth observing that George H.W. Bush eventually
signed a version of the TVPA into law. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing
on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. 11–16 (1990) (statement of John O. McGinnis, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice) (arguing that the international prevention of
torture can better be realized through multilateral agreements rather than through the
unilateral nature of the TVPA).
108
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
109
Statement of Interest of the United States, Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of the Union of Burma v.
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In the early years, the ATS had somewhat of a mixed reception before
the courts. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the immediate aftermath of
Filártiga, judges appointed by Republican presidents tended to take a much
more skeptical view of ATS claims. As one commentator has shown, with
respect to the first twelve cases filed, that 77% of Republican-appointed
judges ruled in favor of dismissal of ATS claims as opposed to 50% of
Democrat-appointed judges.110 The most well-known of these early cases
was Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a split-panel D.C. Circuit decision
in which Judge Bork famously opined that the ATS was simply a
jurisdictional statute, which should not be read to require that “our courts
must sit in judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own
countries with respect to their own citizens.”111 Through the early part of
the Administration of George W. Bush, the ATS decisions were sufficiently
confusing and disjointed that judges, commentators, and litigants alike were
all clamoring for intervention by the Supreme Court.112
2. Strident Backlash Against ATS by Business and National Security
Interests: 2000–Present
During George W. Bush’s presidency, the executive branch’s hostility
to judicial enforcement of ATS claims took a decisive turn. Early on, the
Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 361–62 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (Civ. No. 96-6112-RAP(BQRx));
Statement of Interest of the United States, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069).
110
See Tolley, supra note 76, at 633.
111
726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
112
Take for example the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Tel-Oren. Judge
Edwards concurred, saying:
This case deals with an area of the law that cries out for clarification by the
Supreme Court. We confront at every turn broad and novel questions about the
definition and application of the “law of nations.” As is obvious from the
laborious efforts of opinion writing, the questions posed defy easy answers.
Id. at 775. Judge Bork, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed:
[T]he three opinions we have produced can only add to the confusion surrounding
this subject. The meaning and application of section 1350 will have to await
clarification elsewhere. Since section 1350 appears to be generating an increasing
amount of litigation, it is to be hoped that clarification will not be long delayed. In
the meantime, it is impossible to say even what the law of this circuit is. Though
we agree on nothing else, I am sure my colleagues join me in finding that
regrettable.
Id. at 823; see also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 461–63 (1989) (recounting the
unpredictable history of ATS jurisprudence in the pre-Sosa era).
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Bush Administration announced that it would not challenge these claims in
court.113 Subsequently, however, in amicus briefs submitted at all levels of
the federal judiciary, the Bush Justice Department adopted a position that
implicitly renounced the Second Circuit’s holding in Filártiga.114 The Bush
Administration embraced a view that was radically different from that of
prior Democratic administrations by arguing that the ATS was purely
jurisdictional and did not create a cognizable cause of action.115 It also
adopted a more skeptical stance on the likely implications of ATS
adjudication on American foreign policy.
Significantly, the Bush
Administration counseled against the use of judicial common law in
discerning what qualifies as a violation of the “law of nations” under the
ATS. “[C]ourts must rely upon legislative guidance before exercising
substantive law-making authority,” the Justice Department brief warned in
Unocal, “and there is heightened need for such guidance when the issues
could impinge upon the ‘discretion of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in managing foreign affairs.’”116
So what changed between the immediate post-Filártiga era and the
later period of the Bush Administration? First, the events of September 11,
2001 catapulted issues related to fighting terrorism to the fore of the foreign
policy agenda. Thus, the political climate became decisively less conducive
to emphasizing human rights as a policy priority. For the Bush
Administration, the benefits of securing the cooperation of foreign allies in
the struggle against terrorism seemed to outweigh the costs of domestic
criticism of many of these allies.117 Moreover, as the Bush Administration
113

See MERTUS, supra note 72, at 192 (“The election of George W. Bush had many of the
lawyers worried that the State Department would begin obstructing [ATS] cases. Yet when,
after the administration was installed, the State Department indicated it would not bring new
challenges to the [ATS], human rights lawyers thought they were in the clear.”).
114
See Stephens, supra note 105, at 773 (“The Bush administration adamantly opposed
all ATS litigation as an interference in the foreign affairs powers of the executive
branch . . . . [It] filed repeated submissions in corporate-defendant ATS cases, arguing that
judicial involvement interferes with foreign policy.”).
115
See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 5–12, Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628) (“It is a fundamental mistake
to read the ATS as anything but a jurisdictional provision . . . . [T]he origins of the ATS are
consistent with an understanding that it grants the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction
over only those claims brought to enforce the ‘law of nations’ insofar as that law has been
affirmatively incorporated into the laws of the United States.”).
116
Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8,
at 3.
117
For instance, in a State Department letter in an ATS case with a potential for political
backlash from the Indonesian government, the Bush Administration argued: “U.S. counterterrorism initiatives could be imperiled in numerous ways if Indonesia and its officials
curtailed cooperation in response to perceived disrespect for its sovereign interests.” Letter
from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer,
U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Columbia 3 (July 29, 2002) (on file with the U.S.
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came under increasing scrutiny for its own practices in interrogating and
detaining terrorist suspects,118 any emphasis on promoting human rights
abroad would have likely proven to be an unwelcome distraction. Second,
the decision by the Supreme Court to cite favorably to foreign and
international law in a couple of controversial cases involving the juvenile
death penalty and gay rights had mobilized a vocal public backlash against
the use of international law in U.S. courts.119
Third, and most important, in the early-2000s, more courts started to
endorse the notion that foreign and American corporations could be held
liable for the human rights abuses committed by foreign governments under
an ATS aiding and abetting theory.120 To be sure, expanding the target of

Dep’t of State).
118
See, e.g., Paul Hoffman, Human Rights and Terrorism, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 932, 933
(2004) (“The way this ‘war’ is being waged is itself a threat to human security. By
challenging the framework of international human rights and humanitarian law, so
painstakingly developed over the last several decades, the ‘war on terrorism’ undermines our
security more than any terrorist bombing.”); Rodney C. Roberts, The American Value of
Fear and the Indefinite Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 21 PUB. AFF. Q. 405, 405 (2007)
(“[T]he treatment of these [detained] men is not merely illegal, but also immoral and
unjust.”); Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Awaits Rules on Terrorism Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/washington/25interrogate.html (“The
interrogation of high-level terrorism suspects in C.I.A. prisons is one of the most criticized
aspects of the Bush administration’s response to the Sept. 11 attacks.”).
119
Both of the cases were narrowly decided and featured sharp dissents criticizing the
majorities’ discussion of international law. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the
Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—
ought to be rejected out of hand.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States
choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less do they
spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize
conduct.”); cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 273 (2006) (recounting congressional
reaction to Roper: “The halls of Congress seemed to shudder with anger . . . Representative
Tom C. Feeney [said], ‘The Supreme Court has insulted the Constitution by overturning its
own precedent to appease contemporary foreign laws, social trends, and attitudes,’ . . . .”);
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291,
296 (2005) (“Foreign and international law cannot be legitimately used in an outcomedeterminative way to decide questions of constitutional interpretation.”).
120
There is a fairly vibrant debate about the wisdom of extending ATS liability to
corporate conduct. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 16, at 273–75; Chimène Keitner,
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 (2008–2009)
(“[C]orporate ATS litigation has become a battleground in broader struggles over the role of
tort litigation in regulating corporate behavior, and the role of U.S. courts in disputes that
may implicate foreign affairs.”); David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR
Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case
for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 339
(2011).
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ATS litigation to include American and foreign corporations made it much
more likely that plaintiffs would be able to recover the kinds of monetary
judgments that eluded them when they only sued foreign political officials.
But this development mobilized domestic business constituencies that had
remained relatively agnostic when ATS litigation started in the early-1980s.
Extending ATS litigation to include aiding and abetting claims against
corporations was denounced by business leaders as a purely self-interested
ploy by the tort plaintiffs’ bar.121 For instance, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce released a publication warning its members that ATS lawsuits
were part of a broader strategy by plaintiffs’ lawyers to use the unfavorable
publicity of potential lawsuits and other out-of-court tactics to extract huge
settlements from corporate defendants.122 John Howard, the Vice President
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at the time, alerted the business
community in a 2002 editorial: “Did you know that, under current U.S. law,
foreigners could sue your company in U.S. courts—if you simply did
business, paid taxes, and complied with the laws of a foreign country in
which those foreigners allege that an atrocity occurred?”123 Such business
groups became more active in litigation efforts to secure a narrower
interpretation of the ATS, usually by amicus filings in aiding and abetting
cases.124 Foreign nations that had a significant multinational presence in the
developing world also started submitting briefs expressing concern about
the jurisdictional reach of the ATS.125 As the number of ATS lawsuits
targeting corporations proliferated, reaching over 150 cases in 2011 by one
account,126 business friendly commentators argued that the ATS was ripe
for legislative intervention.127 In 2005 Senator Diane Feinstein, a liberal
Democrat from California, proposed an amendment to the ATS that would
limit its scope to direct participation in the most heinous international
121
“U.S. national interests,” the Vice President of the Chamber declared in a 2002 op-ed
piece, “require that we not allow the continuing misapplication of this 18th century statute to
21st century problems by the latter day pirates of the plaintiffs’ bar.” John E. Howard, The
Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Oct. 9, 2002),
http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/2002/alien-tort-claims-act-our-litigation.
122
See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends
and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456
(2011).
123
Howard, supra note 121.
124
See, e.g., Brief of National Foreign Trade Council et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008) (No. 07919), 2008 WL 437020 (arguing that ATS litigation will hurt foreign investment).
125
See, e.g., Brief of European Commission as Amicus Curiae at 4–13, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 177036 (arguing that the ATS’s
extraterritorial reach should be limited by principles of prescriptive jurisdiction).
126
See Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 120, at 460.
127
See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER:
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 56 (2003).
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crimes.128 As a result, she was denounced by some fellow progressives as
beholden to corporate interests.129 Facing a growing outcry from
progressive human rights groups, Senator Feinstein eventually capitulated
and withdrew the bill.130
Leading conservative commentators also joined the fray, calling on
judges to step up and stop the menace of runaway tort suits against
domestic corporations by foreign plaintiffs in American courts. In a 2003
Wall Street Journal editorial, former Supreme Court Nominee Robert Bork
ridiculed the notion that judges could fashion a cause of action for plaintiffs
based upon evolving customary international law principles that were not
endorsed by Congress.131 “The notion that the [ATS] is infinitely
expandable,” he noted, “is absurd.”132 This skeptical view was increasingly
echoed by conservative academic commentators not only within law
schools,133 but also in think tanks and economic circles. For instance, Gary
Hufbauer, a prominent economic commentator and Fellow at the Institute
for International Economics, coauthored a piece that estimated that ATS
lawsuits could depress U.S. foreign trade with target countries by as much
as ten percent, causing $42 billion loss in American imports and $21 billion
loss in U.S. exports.134 Other commentators have expressed skepticism as
to whether the costs of litigation against corporations under the ATS would
be worth the benefits in terms of improvement of human rights practices
abroad.135
When the Supreme Court decided to hear its first ATS case, Sosa v.

128

Her proposal would have limited ATS claims to plaintiffs “asserting a claim of torture,
extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, or slave trading if a defendant is a direct
participant acting with specific intent to commit the alleged tort.” S. 1874, 109th Cong. (as
introduced, Oct. 17, 2005).
129
See Ariel Meyerstein, The Law and Lawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 299, 328–32 (2007).
130
Letter from Diane Feinstein, U.S. Senator, to Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator (Oct. 25,
2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/05113-ij-atcafeinsteinto-specter.pdf.
131
See Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2003, at A16,
available at http://www.aei.org/article/judicial-imperialism/.
132
Id.
133
See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353 (2010); Michael D.
Ramsey, Multinational Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Some
Structural Concerns, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 361 (2001).
134
See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of
the Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 255 (2004); see also HUFBAUER &
MITROKOSTAS, supra note 125, at 38.
135
See, e.g., Alan Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien
Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161 (2012).
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Alvarez-Machain,136 the Bush Administration encouraged the Justices to
intervene and stop the onslaught of ATS litigation in the lower courts.137 In
Sosa, a Mexican doctor who was kidnapped and brought to the United
States to face charges with regard to his alleged role in the murder of an
American federal agent, sued one of his Mexican captors.138 The
government endorsed a categorical rule that the ATS could not apply to
torts committed outside the United States: “Nothing in Section 1350, or in
its contemporary history, suggests that Congress contemplated suits that
would be brought based on conduct against aliens in foreign lands.”139 The
Solicitor General at the time, Ted Olson, also denounced the Ninth Circuit’s
decision finding a cause of action under the ATS for the plaintiff as a
“judicial exercise [that] was profoundly out of line with the separation of
powers.”140 John Bellinger, the State Department Legal Adviser under the
Bush Administration, later called for the political branches to step in and
protect the prerogative of the executive branch in foreign policy.141
Predictably, the Bush Administration’s position set off enormous
criticism in certain quarters. Harold Koh, the State Department Legal
Adviser under the early part of the Obama Administration, but a Yale Law
School Professor at the time, declared that the Bush Administration “sought
to upend almost 25 years of court rulings and contradicts previous
government interpretations.”142 A leader of Human Rights Watch, a
prominent Washington-based non-governmental organization (NGO),
released a statement announcing that the administration’s approach did not
have “anything to do with the war on terror, . . . I think this is motivated by
a very hard-core ideological resistance within the Justice Department to the
whole concept of international law being enforced.”143
When the Sosa Court addressed the scope of ATS claims, it rendered a
sufficiently cautious and parsed decision that left ideologues and interest
groups on both sides of the partisan divide claiming victory.144 Although
136

542 U.S. 692 (2004).
See Sosa Brief for the United States, supra note 10, at 7–10.
138
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98.
139
Sosa Brief for the United States, supra note 10, at 48.
140
Id. at 7.
141
John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien
Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 11–14 (2009).
142
MERTUS, supra note 70, at 193.
143
See id. at 194 (quoting Tom Malinowski, Director, Human Rights Watch).
144
For example, scholars have differed widely in their views of the ramifications of the
Sosa decision. Compare Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:
What Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
111, 112–13 (2004) (observing “the Court’s scant description of the test it envisions,” but
arguing that the ruling left the ATS’s function “quite modest and limited” because it requires
an “inquiry . . . that is far more restrictive than may initially appear”), with Beth Stephens,
137
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the Court concluded that the ATS itself was merely a jurisdictional statute
that did not create a cause of action for violations of the law of nations, it
also ruled that courts could still recognize federal common law claims
provided such claims “rest on a norm of international character accepted by
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”145
Pro-business interest groups immediately applauded the Court’s
decision as vindicating a very limited and circumscribed vision of
judiciable ATS claims. For instance, Bill Reinsch, President of the
National Foreign Trade Council announced:
We welcome the Court’s ruling in the Sosa case, which more closely
limits the use of the ATS—a statute that has been misused more and
more often over the last decade . . . . Particularly distressing has
been the use of the ATS in a growing number of cases against
multinational corporations that do business around the world. While
the Sosa case did not involve American business, we believe the
Court’s opinion clearly indicates that the ATS should not be used to
institute foreign policy in American courts.146

On the other hand, Earth Rights International, the Human Rights NGO
that represented the plaintiffs in the Unocal case, crowed that the ruling
“sent a clear message to the corporate lobby and the Bush Administration
that human rights matter, and that U.S. courts have an important role to play
in their promotion and protection.”147
The Sosa justices were also divided along a somewhat ideological
dimension. Predictably, the conservative justices were skeptical of judicial
enforcement of ATS claims in the absence of a separate, legislativelycreated cause of action. In a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, for instance, Justice Scalia criticized the
majority for going too far in suggesting that federal courts could create

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S.
Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 535 (2004) (observing that while those who sought an
expansive interpretation of the ATS and those who wanted the court to render it useless were
disappointed, “the decision is a clear victory for those human rights advocates who view the
statute as a means to hold the most egregious perpetrators accountable for the most egregious
violations of international law”).
145
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
146
Elizabeth Ann Chandler, NFTC and USA*Engage Cite U.S. Supreme Court Decision
to More Narrowly Define Alien Tort Provision as Important Step in Curbing Erroneous
Lawsuits, NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL (June 30, 2004) (quoting Bill Reinsch),
http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=1691.
147
EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, IN OUR COURT: ATCA, SOSA AND THE TRIUMPH OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 5 (2004), available at http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/inour-court.pdf.
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causes of action for the enforcement of international law norms.148 More
broadly, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion underscored a recurring
concern of conservatives: progressive elites were exploiting both the courts
and the open ended ambiguity of customary international law to achieve
policy goals that they could not otherwise achieve in the political arena.149
Specifically, his concurrence linked the proliferation of ATS litigation to a
broader effort by progressive elites to impose international law norms in the
United States.150 To a certain degree, such grounds for skepticism are not
entirely unfounded. One might reasonably conjecture that if courts succeed
in rehabilitating a vision of customary international law that can expose
foreign actors to liability in the United States, then it is very likely that they
will eventually hold that such norms also bind domestic state and federal
actors.
One contentious issue that the Sosa decision left largely unresolved is
how much deference courts ought to accord to submissions by the executive
branch regarding the foreign policy implications of ATS litigation. The
Supreme Court observed that “a strong argument [can be made] that federal
courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the
case’s impact on foreign policy.”151 The Court, however, did not specify
how judges would go about evaluating the credibility of the executive
branch’s “friend of the court” submissions in ATS disputes. Take, for
instance, how courts have treated submissions made by the Bush
Administration in ATS litigation. In six out of the eight ATS cases in
which the Bush Justice Department submitted amicus briefs, courts refused
to accept the Administration’s arguments that adjudication would hinder

148

Take, for example, this statement by Justice Scalia:

The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any
subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of its
own citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist
law professors and human rights advocates . . . . The Framers would, I am
confident, be appalled by the proposition that, for example, the American peoples’
democratic adoption of the death penalty . . . could be judicially nullified because
of the disapproving views of foreigners.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149
See id.
150
See id. at 750. For commentary supporting such a view, see John R. Bolton, Should
We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 205–06 (2000) (describing a
division between an elite class of academics and media professionals who favor international
law and global governance and a majority of Americans who are against it); JEREMY A.
RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES
SOVEREIGN STATES 16 (2005) (arguing against reliance on global governance norms favored
by European elites).
151
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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foreign policy objectives.152 Since the ATS ultimately involves questions of
statutory interpretation, there is no obvious presumption of judicial
deference towards the executive branch. But one might, nonetheless,
speculate as to why courts have proven to be consistently less deferential to
the executive branch in this area. One plausible explanation is that the
divergent and inconsistent positions adopted by Democratic and Republican
administrations have made courts wary that executive branch submissions
might be tainted by “partisan” considerations.
On the political front, the pendulum has swung back to a more
favorable view of ATS judicial enforcement. Other than obvious partisan
considerations, concerns about interrogation and detention practices under
the Bush Administration might have also played a role in framing the
political context in which the current Administration is approaching ATS
litigation. Nonetheless, the Obama Administration adopted positions in
litigation that were not only solicitous of the notion of corporate liability
under the ATS, but that implicitly repudiated the institutional concerns
regarding ATS litigation advanced by its predecessor.153
In at least one case, the Obama Administration actually took the
unusual step of reversing course from a previous administration’s position
on the foreign policy implications of an ATS lawsuit while the litigation
was still pending. In that case, In re S. African Apartheid Litigation,
plaintiffs had brought an ATS suit accusing several major multinational
corporations of aiding and abetting the apartheid South African
government.154 After almost eight years of litigation, with the case going
back and forth between the district court and the Second Circuit, the
defendants filed for dismissal on comity grounds. The district court denied
their motion, and the defendants sought interlocutory appeal of the district

152

See Stephens, Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, supra note 105, at
774, app. c.
153
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Pfizer, Inc., v. Rabi Abdullahi,
130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010) (No. 09-34.), 2010 WL 2214874 (arguing against granting certiorari
in ATS case in part because there was no departure from other circuits when the Ninth
Circuit allowed an ATS claim to proceed on the basis of the Nigerian government’s alleged
participation in a non-consensual medical test); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 3 (arguing in support of ATS plaintiffs that a corporation
can be held liable in a federal common law suit based on the ATS for violating the law of
nations).
154
617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). For the long and complicated posture of this
case, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1–6,
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, No. 09–2778–cv (2d Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Balintulo Amicus
Brief
for
United
States],
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153495.pdf. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit
has ruled on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
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court’s order denying dismissal.155 On appeal, the main question was
whether the Second Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the defendants’
interlocutory appeal. Second Circuit jurisdiction would only exist when a
final decision of the district court on the merits would be otherwise
unreviewable. In 2005, the Bush Administration submitted an amicus brief
in which it favored the Second Circuit’s dismissal of the case because “[i]t
would be extraordinary to give U.S. law an extraterritorial effect in such
circumstances to regulate conduct of a foreign state over its citizens, and all
the more so for a federal court to do so as a matter of common law-making
power.”156
Four years later, with a decision still pending before the Second
Circuit, the Obama Administration filed an amicus brief urging the court
not to dismiss the ATS claims because it had no jurisdiction to review the
case. In order to suggest that there was no obvious conflict with the
previous Administration’s position, the Obama Administration argued that
the Bush Administration did not explicitly request a dismissal.157
According to the government brief:
[T]he court of appeals has jurisdiction under the collateral order
doctrine only if the district court denied defendant’s motion despite
the fact that the Executive Branch explicitly sought dismissal of the
suit on [foreign relations] ground[s]. The requirement of an explicit
request for dismissal on foreign policy grounds by the Executive
Branch is, in our view, critical.158

Despite its technical parsing of the legal rules, the government’s brief
was clearly signaling a change in policy from the prior Administration with
respect to the prospect of corporate liability under the ATS. The Bush
Administration’s objection to the litigation in 2005 was not necessarily
limited to the specific political context of South Africa, but to what it
perceived as the broader foreign policy dangers of permitting aiding and

155

See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In
declining the motion to dismiss, the district court found that the foreign policy concerns
previously stated by the United States in the 2005 brief were militated by the plaintiff’s
decision to file a narrower complaint. See id. at 276, 283–84, 286 n.259.
156
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 5,
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2005) (Nos. 05–2141–cv, 05–
2326–cv), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87317.pdf.
157
See Balintulo Amicus Brief for United States, supra note 154, at 11 (observing that
despite the Bush Administration’s clear opposition to the litigation in a prior brief, “at no
time did the United States explicitly inform the courts that the case-specific impact these
suits would have on the United States’ foreign policy was a sufficient basis by itself for
dismissal”).
158
Id. (emphasis in original).
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abetting liability against corporations under the ATS.159 By contrast, the
Obama Administration focused on the fact that since the South African
government had withdrawn its prior objection to the litigation, the concerns
about interfering with the executive branch’s conduct of foreign affairs
were no longer relevant.160
C. The Government’s Peculiar Posture in Kiobel: A Collision Between
Partisan and Institutional Interests?
The politically fraught issue of corporate liability under the ATS
eventually reached the Supreme Court in in the recent case of Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.161 The Second Circuit rejected a claim by
Nigerian citizens alleging that foreign oil companies had aided and abetted
atrocities committed by the Nigerian government.162 Observing that the
ATS was a jurisdictional statute that did not create any new causes of
action, the Second Circuit concluded that “international law of human rights
does not impose any form of liability on corporations. . . .”163 Since Sosa
had not resolved the question of corporate liability under the ATS, and there
was a growing circuit split on the issue,164 the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari in Kiobel was hardly a surprise.
But the Supreme Court decided to duck the corporate liability issue in
Kiobel, and instead rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on extraterritoriality
grounds.165 In holding that the conduct alleged by the plaintiffs did not

159

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, supra note
156, at 27 (“[G]iven the enormous practical consequences of broadening the scope of the
ATS if this form of secondary civil liability were added, the courts should follow the
Supreme Court’s admonition in Sosa to exercise great caution against importing
international criminal concepts of aiding and abetting into domestic tort law.”).
160
Balintulo Amicus Brief for United States, supra note 154, at 20–21 (“The Justice
Minister [of South Africa] . . . is now of the view that this Court is an appropriate forum to
hear the remaining claims of aiding and abetting in violation of international law. The
United States takes at face value these formal statements from a high level South African
government official.”).
161
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
162
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d on other
grounds, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
163
Id. at 147.
164
Compare id. (holding private corporations cannot have liability) with Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11(D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding private corporations can have liability);
see also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that ATS does
not provide an exception for corporations); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d
1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding the same as Romero).
165
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (“The principles underlying the presumption against
extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS”). The Court
initially granted certiorari in Kiobel to address two specific issues: (1) whether the issue of
corporate civil tort liability under the ATS is a merits question or instead an issue of subject
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have a sufficient connection to the United States, the Court relied heavily
on Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,166 a recent case that applied
the presumption against extraterritoriality to antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act. The Court’s embrace of this winning doctrinal
hook was not entirely fortuitous. Two former Bush Administration
officials—John Bellinger (Former Department of State Legal Adviser) and
Paul Clement (Former Solicitor General)—had pushed the extraterritoriality
argument on behalf of corporate clients during the first round of Kiobel.167
More broadly, the Bush Administration had argued in two amicus briefs
before the Supreme Court in 2004 and 2008 as well as in numerous
appellate court briefs that the ATS should not apply overseas.168
Kiobel illustrates the likely tension that the executive branch faces in
human rights litigation when it has to choose between its institutional and
partisan (or policy) preferences. As the case wound its way up to the
Supreme Court, there were some unusual twists and turns in the litigation
posture of the United States. In the original amicus brief filed before the
Court, Solicitor General Verilli initially supported the plaintiffs’ position
that foreign corporations could be held liable for international human rights
violations under the ATS—a posture at odds with that adopted by the Bush
Administration.169 But in response to the Court’s request for re-argument
and further briefing,170 the Solicitor General argued that the Kiobel case
ought to be dismissed because it involved a foreign corporate defendant and
matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations
of the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions, or genocide or may instead be
sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant under the ATS for such
egregious violations. See Brief for Respondents at (i), Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10–1491), 2012 WL 259389, at *i. But after both briefing and
oral argument on the case, the Court took the unusual step of asking the parties to reargue the
case and brief the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the ATS. See Order Restoring Case to
Calender for Reargument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (Mar. 5,
2012) (No. 10–1491); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Seeks Clarification on Jurisdiction in a
Human Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A15.
166
130 S. (2010).
167
See Brief of Amici Curiae, BP America et al. in support of Respondents at 5–24,
Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10–1491), 2012 WL
392536.
168
See Sosa Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 8–9; Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S.
1028 (2008) (No. 07-919), 2008 WL 408389; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 12, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
Nos.
02–56256,
02–56390
(9th
Cir.
Sept.
28,
2006),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98376.pdf; Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 3, Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., Nos.
05–56175, 05–56178, 05–56056 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2006).
169
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 3.
170
See Order Restoring Case to Calendar for Reargument, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012).
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hence lacked a sufficient nexus to the United States.171 The government’s
brief conceded, however, that the requisite nexus might be established if the
defendant were a United States corporation.172 Tactically, the Solicitor
General’s office likely decided it could not afford to backtrack completely
on the position it adopted before the Court in Sosa and Ntsebeza—that the
ATS should not apply to purely extraterritorial claims.173 As commentators
observed, however, it is not certain that all institutional players in the
executive branch were on board with the Solicitor General’s move.174 For
instance, conspicuously absent from the government’s brief in favor of
dismissal of the Kiobel plaintiffs’ claim was the State Department’s Legal
Adviser, who had joined the earlier brief on the issue of corporate liability
and who had signed off on all the previous government briefs in ATS
cases.175
In Kiobel, the Obama Administration likely had to make both strategic
and prudential choices between the claims of two competing constituencies.
One obvious constituency would be the progressive NGOs that filed amicus
briefs before the Court in support of the Kiobel plaintiffs. The other
plausible constituency is the Solicitor General’s office, which might have
been more concerned about defending its institutional interests.
Specifically, the Solicitor General’s office includes career lawyers who are
not only likely to take a long view of the executive branch’s institutional
preferences, but who may also have distinct reputational concerns as repeat
players before the Court.176 These career lawyers are likely to be wary
171
The government did not argue in favor of a blanket rule against extra-territorial
claims, but argued that there could be an exception if the extraterritorial tort claims alleged
under the ATS would likely expose the United States government to liability. See
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance,
supra note 10, at 3.
172
See id. at 21.
173
More specifically, the Solicitor General staked out this position on extraterritoriality in
its brief in the Sosa case, although the Court did not ultimately decide the case on that basis.
See Sosa Brief for the United States, supra note 10, at 8–9.
174
One such observer was John Bellinger, the State Department Legal Adviser under the
Bush Administration. See John Bellinger, Kiobel: Obama Administration Supports Shell,
Argues ATS Should Not Apply to Aiding-and-Abetting Suits Against Foreign Corporations,
Leaves Open Possibility of Suits Against U.S. Corporations, LAWFARE BLOG (June 13, 2012,
7:55 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/kiobel-obama-administration-supportsshell-argues-ats-should-not-apply-to-aiding-and-abetting-suits-against-foreign-corporationsleaves-open-possibility-of-suits-against-u-s-corporations/.
175
See id.
176
Various scholars have commented on the unique position occupied by the office of the
Solicitor General and the tension it faces when it has to adopt political positions in litigation.
See David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 172 (1998) (“The Solicitor General’s Office appears before the
Supreme Court dozens of times a year. The Office’s reputation with the Justices, and the
Court’s image of the Office, are very important . . . . If the Court generally trusts the Office
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about changing litigation positions on constitutional and statutory issues
simply because of the arrival of a new administration with different policy
priorities.177 As Bruce Ackerman has argued elsewhere, the Solicitor
General’s culture of taking the long view with regard to the executive
branch’s priorities might not be shared by other offices within the Justice
Department, where short-term political appointments are more common.178
Perhaps different institutional norms might explain why government
attorneys outside the Solicitor General’s office appeared to be more willing
to stake out inconsistent positions on ATS litigation across presidential
administrations. Even with that qualification, however, one might expect
that the practice of blatantly reversing litigation positions by government
attorneys should be relatively rare. As one commentator put it, “once
lawyers from Departments of Justice and State take a position before the
courts, they, to a certain extent, lock in their successors. While it is not
unheard of for lawyers from one administration to repudiate positions taken
in prior judicial filings, such reversals come at a considerable cost.”179
Even then, the Solicitor General’s position in Kiobel did not square
comfortably with what that office told the Court a few years earlier in Sosa.
Indeed, in what seemed like a partial about face from the government’s
position in Sosa, that the ATS did not apply extraterritorially regardless of
the defendant’s identity, Solicitor General Verilli now seemed to favor a
multifactor approach in which United States (and not foreign) corporations
could be held liable for a tort committed abroad under the ATS. In an
exchange with the Solicitor General during oral argument, both Justice
to engage in its traditional form of advocacy—which, as noted above, falls somewhere
between what a private party would do and the impartial “tenth Justice” version—the Office
will be more effective.”); John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor
General’s Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 810
(1992) (“The Solicitor General’s career officials enhance their status and autonomy by
projecting the image of a group of independent Supreme Court experts whose task is to
interpret precedent for the Court—perhaps with a slight executive branch spin on
interpretation, but certainly without expressing any assertive or radical views that would
detract from the appearance of independence.”); cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the
Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010) (analyzing the relative stability of
the executive branch’s legal positions).
177
As one commentator has observed about the Solicitor General’s office, a distinction
can be often be drawn between litigating the direct institutional interests of the federal
government and other ideologically fraught issues that have only incidental or indirect
institutional implications. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323,
1377–78 (2010).
178
See Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside the Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124
HARV. L. REV. F. 13, 16 (2011) (suggesting that the contemporary Office of Legal Counsel
has been much more politicized than the Solicitor General’s Office).
179
Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Change: International Human Rights Under the
Obama Administration, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 488, 502 (2012).
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Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts mused openly about which one of the
Solicitor General’s conflicting positions warranted deference from the
Court:
GENERAL VERILLI: I — I think Filartiga is the paradigm, and
cases like Filartiga are the paradigm that — where we think ATS —
ATS causes of action should be recognized.
JUSTICE SCALIA: General Verrilli, the — that’s — that is a new
position for the — for the State Department, isn’t it?
GENERAL VERILLI: It’s a new —
JUSTICE SCALIA: And for — and for the United States
Government? Why should — why should we listen to you rather
than the solicitors general who took the opposite position and the
position taken by Respondents here in other cases, not only in
several courts of appeals, but even up here?
....
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your successors may adopt a different
view. And I think — I don’t want to put words in his mouth, but
Justice Scalia’s point means whatever deference you are entitled to is
compromised by the fact that your predecessors took a different
position.180

One could argue, however, that Solicitor General Verrili found himself
in a relatively unusual situation in Kiobel: if he embraced the underlying
logic of the Bush Administration’s position in Sosa, the ATS would be
essentially rendered a dead letter. After all, the government’s position in
Sosa did not leave much wiggle room to make fine-tuned doctrinal
distinctions in a latter case.181 Given the seeming inconsistency of the

180
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10–
1491
(U.S.
Oct.
1,
2012)
(No.
10–1491),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491rearg.pdf.
181
In response to Justice Scalia’s question in Kiobel, Verrilli argued that the executive
branch has to balance competing interests in foreign affairs. Justice Scalia seemed
unconvinced:

GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, Justice Scalia, in a case like this one, in cases under
the Alien Tort Statute, the United States has multiple interests. We certainly have
foreign relations interests in avoiding friction with foreign governments; we have
interests in avoiding subjecting United States companies to liability abroad. We
also have interests in ensuring that our Nation’s foreign relations commitments to
the rule of law and human rights are not eroded.
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Solicitor General’s position across electoral cycles on the institutional
interests at stake, the justices likely decided not to accord much deference
to the government’s position in Kiobel.
Ultimately, the Court’s decision trimmed back the role of the federal
judiciary in ATS controversies, an outcome inconsistent with what an
empire building model of judicial behavior would predict. But whether the
holding in the case will be a setback for cause lawyering by human rights
groups, or whether it will simply shifts advocacy efforts to more promising
alternative avenues, remains an open question.182
V. CONCLUSION AND SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Although human rights litigation often arouses weighty debates in the
legal literature, judicial enforcement of international human rights in the
United State over the past three decades seems to have been shaped in part
by both fortuitous circumstances and distributive partisan politics.
Transformation in the attitudes by the international community and a
solicitous reception by domestic judges are usually not sufficient for
expansive human rights enforcement. Willingness by the executive branch
is important as well. But different administrations may have conflicting
preferences towards expanding the role of courts in this arena. For instance,
while a popular backlash against the United States role in Vietnam and the
spread of new international human rights agreements in the 1970s gave
President Carter the political opening to push a human rights agenda in the
courts, it does not imply that others would have chosen the same path.

JUSTICE SCALIA: I understand that, but –
GENERAL VERRILLI: It’s my responsibility to balance those sometimes
competing interests and make a judgment about what the position of the United
States should be, consistent with existing law.
JUSTICE SCALIA: It — it was –
GENERAL VERRILLI: And we have done so.
JUSTICE SCALIA: — it was the responsibility of your predecessors as well, and
they took a different position. So, you know, why — why should we defer to the
views of — of the current administration?
Id. at 43–44.
182
See Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality,
28
MD
J.
INT’L
L.
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2255628 (arguing that the Kiobel
decision marks an opportunity to renew efforts to return to more vigorous international
lawmaking based on multilateral consensus).
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Faced with a similar proliferation of international human rights agreements
in the aftermath of WWII, the Eisenhower Administration took a firm
stance against the notion that international norms of human rights could be
binding in U.S. courts.183 And ever since Carter formally supported broader
judicial enforcement of the ATS in Filártiga, Republican and Democratic
administrations have staked out divergent positions not only as to the
statutory scope of the ATS, but also as to whether judicial enforcement
would hinder or promote key American foreign policy objectives.
In the United States, Republican administrations are not only less
ideologically inclined to push human rights enforcement as a foreign policy
priority, they also appear to gain less electorally from doing so, since
human rights tends to be most salient to left-leaning constituencies. Indeed,
Republican-leaning business and national security interests have tended to
view the expansion of ATS litigation not only as a threat to their
commercial and ideological interests, but as a boon to the left-leaning tort
plaintiffs’ bar. On the other hand, Democratic administrations have
discovered that they can not only appeal to their core constituencies by
emphasizing human rights, but more importantly, they can also exploit it as
a wedge issue to discredit controversial foreign policy positions of the
Republican opposition. In many respects, the ideological battles over
judicial enforcement under the ATS has mirrored many of the broader
debates about the role that human rights should play in shaping American
foreign policy. If one also considers the recent tendency of federal courts to
cite approvingly to foreign and international law in politically charged
controversies touching on issues like the death penalty and homosexual
rights, it is perhaps not surprising that contemporary human rights litigation
in the United States has come to be characterized by the logic of distributive
politics.184
If all this is true, what should the courts do? One might argue that if
the courts could coordinate around a common interpretive method or
historical account of the origins of the ATS, then much of this protracted
conflict could be avoided. For instance, it is plausible to think that with

183

See HOLMAN supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also supra note 91, and
accompanying text; cf. Nzelibe, supra note 70, at 669 (2011) (“After all, even though
Eisenhower had disfavored the Bricker Amendment as an interference with the Executive
Branch’s authority in foreign affairs, he shared his co-partisans’ antipathy to human rights
treaties, which he demonstrated by committing not to negotiate any more such treaties and
by appointing a well-known treaty skeptic to replace Eleanor Roosevelt as delegate to the
United Nations.”).
184
See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 107 AM J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264323 (“Indeed, to the
extent the ‘culture wars’ have played out in U.S. foreign relations law, the ATS has been
their center of gravity.”).
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sufficient historical research and interpretive agreement about which kind
of historical materials are relevant, one might be able to discern a much
clearer understanding about what the framing generation meant by the
phrase “violations of the laws of nations or of a treaty of the United
States.”185 But such an outcome is highly unlikely. Indeed, given the
distributive issues at stake, any quest for interpretive coordination on such
an old statute with sparse legislative history is likely to be self-defeating.
As one commentator noted in another context:
[C]hoosing between textualism or legislative history, isn’t much like
choosing whether to drive on the left side of the road or the right. It
is a mixed game of coordination and distribution, in which judges
desire to coordinate, but some judges would prefer that all coordinate
on one particular rule, while other judges would prefer that all
coordinate on a different rule.186

Setting aside the question of likely distributive effects, one might still
ask if the contemporary judicial enforcement of the ATS is normatively
desirable. This Article does not purport to address that question, but it has
nonetheless some implications for how the normative debate can be framed.
At bottom, claims about the normative implications of expansive or narrow
interpretations of the scope of the ATS are notoriously difficult to evaluate
from both an empirical and theoretical perspective. Take, for instance, the
common argument often made by human rights activists and Democratic
administrations that judicial unwillingness to enforce human rights claims
under the ATS will discourage the spread of human rights in other countries
and undermine international institutions. Other than scattered anecdotes,
there is hardly any empirical support for this claim. As one commentator
sympathetic to the cause of human rights observed, “Human rights norms
have in fact spread widely without much attention to U.S. domestic
policy . . . . [G]overnment after government moved ahead toward more
active domestic and international human rights policies without attending to
U.S. domestic or international practice.”187
Similarly, claims that ATS adjudication will harm American business
interests in any significant way might be overstated. To be sure, the
proliferation of aiding and abetting claims under the ATS should be a
source of some concern for business groups, but it might very well be that
this is one of those circumstances where the judicial bark might be more
than its bite. As legal realists have repeatedly observed, there is often a gulf
between formal litigation outcomes and the implementation of such

185

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
Vermeule, supra note 25, at 571–72 (footnote omitted).
187
Moravcsik, supra note 38, at 192.
186
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outcomes, especially when the issue being litigated touches upon
controversial issues in which there is significant political opposition.188 As
with the issue of civil rights litigation in the 1950s and 1960s, today’s
human rights activists might eventually discover that ATS litigation offers
what Rosenberg and others have called empty promises and “hollow
hope.”189 For instance, despite almost thirty years of litigation under the
ATS, collection of judgments by prevailing plaintiffs has been notoriously
low. Beyond the lack of administrative resources that the courts have for
enforcing their decisions, it is questionable whether future administrations
that are unsympathetic to the ATS will have either the willingness or
resolve to track down scofflaw corporations and foreign state officials and
force them to pay damages. Given these realities, perhaps one normative
recommendation is that we ought to consider dialing down our expectations
and rhetoric regarding the possible impact of ATS litigation.
Finally, a caveat and some words of caution. This Article does not
purport to establish a clear causal relationship between human rights
enforcement in the courts and the partisan orientation of judges and elected
officials. In order to achieve what social scientists would typically call
“goodness of fit,” other plausible explanations of the growth of human
rights litigation would have to be discarded. Nothing in this framework
rules out the possibility that other factors might also help explain the
trajectory of human rights litigation in the United States, including the
modern proliferation of ATS lawsuits.
After all, judges and elected officials are heterogeneous actors who are
susceptible to conflicting institutional and individual motivations, and to
reduce them to single-minded maximizers of ideological or electoral goals
is hardly fair or particularly illuminating. For instance, a plausible
alternative explanation that is not ruled out by this framework is that the
various judges, interest groups, and elected officials who stake out positions
on human rights litigation do so because they are simply taking a moral
stand on a fundamental issue of principle without necessarily expecting to

188
See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1994) (commenting that, despite its hallowed status, “Brown [v. Board of
Education] was directly responsible for only the most token forms of southern public school
desegregation.”) (emphasis in original); ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at 70 (“The use of the
courts in the civil rights movement is considered the paradigm of a successful strategy for
social change . . . . Yet, a closer examination reveals that before Congress and the executive
branch acted, courts had virtually no direct effect on ending discrimination in the key fields
of education, voting, transportation, accommodations and public places, and housing.
Courageous and praiseworthy decisions were rendered, and nothing changed.”) (emphasis in
original); cf. Tracey E. George, Mitu Gulati & Ann C. McGinley, The New Old Legal
Realism, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 689, 733 (2011) (“Even when a case has a myriad of factors
predicting a significant impact on the ground, it can in fact have only a negligible impact.”).
189
See ROSENBERG, supra note 52.

525

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:475 (2013)

influence electoral or political outcomes. Obviously, such a model of
expressive behavior would be incompatible with the instrumental account
espoused here.190 The goal here is not to suggest that an instrumental logic
is the only approach, but that it is at least a plausible part of the story. In
sum, this Article focuses on the partisan political interest in human rights
litigation because it has been largely ignored in the literature and much of
the recent treatment tends to focus on normative approaches that assume
human rights regimes constitute structures of mutually beneficial
cooperation, rather than plausible structures of power with obvious political
losers and winners.

190
Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF.
Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102, 106 (2000) (observing that one principal benefit of ATS lawsuits
may be “the public attention they generate”).
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